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Rebecca Redwood French and Randall Peerenboom have written the two
best books of the last twenty years on the legal cultures and legal history of
Asia. In The Golden Yoke,' French describes the legal system of precolonial
Tibet under the Dalai Lama's rule (1641-1959) with particular attention to its
operation in the 1940s and 1950s. Although Tibetan law lasted longer than that
of any other Buddhist state, French's book presents its first full-length
examination. Law and Morality in Ancient China2 looks back two millenia to
examine the debates between Confucianists, Daoists, and Legalists. The
discovery of the Huang-Lao Boshu3 (silk manuscripts) in 1973 rendered the
standard accounts of early Chinese legal culture out of date, and Peerenboom
is the first to offer a map of the new terrain. Since my own area of research
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lies elsewhere in Asia, I lack the expertise to engage French and Peerenboom
on the minutiae of text and translation. Instead of criticizing details, therefore,
this Review will focus on the authors' arguments and conclusions, which I
believe have an important bearing on the way we understand our lives as
lawyers. Most readers of this Journal regard nothing human as alien to them4
and will agree that "it is the legal systems of the whole world in all their
variety and detail which lie at the heart of legal scholarship." 5 From our
vantage point, the Tibetan legal system described by French and the earliest
Chinese jurisprudential works described by Peerenboom appear as extreme
variations in the population of legal systems. I shall concentrate on what is
different about these Asian traditions-on what is least familiar to us, and
therefore most challenging to our local conception of what law is.
In addition, I shall indulge in the frivolous pastime of model-building. This
innocent activity provides answers to the question, "How far can we generalize
about Asian legal systems as a whole?" Comparative law likes to talk about
the world's legal "families, 6 but seldom considers whether these families fit
together into a higher assembly. Franz Wieacker, describing the civil law and
common law families as subsets of European legal culture, is one of the few
to attempt a taxonomy of legal cultures per species et genera. If Southeast
Asia, Tibet, and Buddhist India make a convincing genus of "Buddhist law,"
we can similarly identify a core Buddhist legal tradition that has traveled
wherever there have been Buddhist monasteries. We can then make direct
comparisons between East, Central, Southeast, and South Asia by treating
Buddhist law as a challenge to which they all had to respond, just as we gauge
the ways in which civil law, common law, Scandinavian law, and Slavic law
responded to Roman legal literature.8 In Tibet and Southeast Asia, the core
Buddhist tradition was just as powerful an influence on local legal literature
as was Roman law on Spanish and French law. Buddhism did not begin to
become established in China, however, until the second century of the
Common Era (CE) and affected Chinese legal culture only at the margins.'
Are there enough similarities between the pre-Buddhist Chinese tradition and
Buddhist legal culture that they can inhabit the same genus? If so, can we keep
adding other Asian legal cultures until we have a genus of Asian law? In light
of the obvious differences between the laws of King Hammurabi, the maritime
laws of Malacca, and the oral customs of slash-and-burn Laotian montagnards,
4. See TERENCE, The Self-Tormentor, in I TERENCE 113, 124 (G.P. Goold ed. & John Sargeaunt trans.,
1979) ("homo sum: humani nil a me alienum puto").
5. Geoffrey Wilson, English Legal Scholarship, 50 MOD. L. REV. 818, 833 (1987).
6. Lawrence M. Friedman, Some Thoughts on Comparative Legal Culture, in COMPARATIVE AND
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 49, 50 (David S. Clark ed., 1990).
7. See Fmnz Wieacker, Foundations of European Legal Culture, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1990).
8. See, e.g., id. at 6, 8 (discussing influence of Roman law on England, Russia, and Balkans as factor
favoring their laws' inclusion in European law genus along with civil law).
9. See E. ZORCHER, THE BUDDHIST CONQUEST OF CHINA 18-80 (2d ed. 1972).
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this last proposal seems overambitious. But how can we tell? How do we
judge the success of comparative model-building?
The various models of Asian legal systems are pretty or ugly to the extent
that they are convincing or ridiculous, but model-building is an art form we
have good reason to practice. In the global legal conversation, at least in that
fraction of it that takes place in European languages, Asia's fragmented
whispers have been drowned out in the general hubbub. The average
European'0 lawyer knows little of India and China, whose written legal
traditions are at least as old as his own. To reveal the overlap (if any) between
what India and China can contribute to this global legal conversation is to
increase their chances of making themselves heard. Duets are louder than
solos.
French and Peerenboom, who both want their legal history to feed into this
general conversation, open with different gambits. Peerenboom translates
Chinese concepts into European jurisprudential terminology. He specifies the
exact sense in which we can describe the silk manuscripts as putting forward
a natural law theory and analyzes their response to three concerns that are as
pressing today as when the Boshu was written: "the need to impose limits on
those in power, to create institutional obstacles to potential abuses by the
ruling class, and to rein in judicial discretion."" French's gambit is to
confront European jurisprudence with Tibetan concepts. She wants her Tibetan
material to shock Europe into recognizing the strangeness inherent in what
Europe has hitherto taken for granted. In the closing pages of The Golden
Yoke, French uses Tibetan legal exotica to light up the walls of Europe's
cultural prison.' 2 As her torch plays on the stones that confine us, we
recognize that each represents a choice our culture made long ago. In this
Review, I shall discuss how far each gambit may be generalized. How many
of French's Tibetan legal exotica may be found elsewhere in Asia? How far
can we apply Peerenboom's analysis of natural law to other Asian legal
cultures? Peerenboom has fashioned natural law into a bridge capable of
spanning half the globe and two millenia. I think it can be used even more
widely than that. I shall suggest that three schools of natural law flourished in
India, China, and the Hellenistic world during the third and second centuries
10. I use "European" as a synecdoche for the cumbersome expression "North American. European.
or belonging to whatever other parts of the world care to identify themselves with an industrial present and
a Christian and Greek past." The boundary between West and East is too hazy to be useful when comparing
different parts of Asia with "the West." Edward Said has shown how Europe treated Cairo and Mecca as
epitomizing the Oriental other, see EDWARD M. SAID, ORIENTAlIStm 31-73 (1978). but to comparative
religion, Islam is a theistic, Western religion, see TREVOR LING. A HISTORY OF REULGION EAST AND WEST
214, 218 (1968) (noting that Muslim monotheism is not novel, but sees itself as within tradiion of Jewish
prophets). Linguists, meanwhile, draw the boundary so that north India ts included in the West. See. e.g..
ANTHONY ARLOTTO, INTRODUCTION TO HISTORICAL LINGUISTICS 51, 104. 107 (1972) (classifying norh
Indian languages as part of Indo-European family of Europe and Middle East).
11. PEERENBOOM, supra note 2, at 266.
12. See FRENCH, supra note 1, at 343-47.
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before the Common Era (BCE) and that these were particularly implicated in
the birth of written legal culture.
Both gambits operate at the level of high culture. It was Chinese
intellectuals, not Chinese peasants, who wrote and read the silk manuscripts,
and it was one of the Dalai Lama's officials who gave French her deepest
insights into Tibetan law. No doubt this intellectual view of law trickled down
to the peasants in some form-how else could Asian states have
survived?-but the texts containing local views of law were preserved,
annotated, and discussed by a literate and leisured minority. French and
Peerenboom are comparing intellectual histories, so it is the intellectual history
of Europe with which they must engage. Postmodernism and specifically the
Neo-Pragmatism of Jean-Frangois Lyotard and Richard Rorty examine this
history with greatest brio.13 Because Peerenboom uses the very latest versions
of natural law theory for his comparison with the Boshu, he has to reckon with
postmodernism. His index contains more citations to Rorty than to any other
non-Sinologist. 14 French uses certain postmodernist strategies to expound her
Tibetan material, but does not directly discuss the postmodern critique of post-
Enlightenment culture. I shall argue at the conclusion of this Review that there
is an overlap between this postmodem critique and the challenges to European
legal culture that French derives from Tibet. A.C. Graham (in the course of a
contrast between the seeker after exact knowledge and the correlative thinker)
finds a similar overlap between postmodernism and certain Chinese themes:
[M]odem philosophy has to take increasing notice of the models,
analogues, metaphors, and paradigms, which still refuse to be expelled
from its realm. It is driven from several directions (by [Ludwig]
Wittgenstein, [Gilbert] Ryle, [Thomas] Kuhn, [Jacques] Derrida) to
admit that if we dig below the surface of our supposedly exact
knowledge we still find the correlative at its foundations. This
recognition is the same as the sinologist's when, in searching for the
metaphorical roots of a Chinese concept, he discovers that to compare
and contrast it with Western concepts he has to explore their roots as
well."5
Those who feel threatened by postmodern claims may find some reassurance
in Asia. Though the assault on subjectivity is something new within European
13. Lyotard and Rorty are of particular interest because their ethical and political concerns are relevant
to the legal conversation. Rorty "reintroduc[es] ... the question of ethics into postmodern discourse." JOHN
McGoWAN, POSTMODERNISM AND ITS CRITIcs 194 (1991). Lyotard has an "explicit concern with the issue
of legitimacy." Id. at 203.
14. The two scholars whom he cites more often than Rorty are Joseph Needham and A.C. Graham,
experts on Chinese science and Chinese philosophy, respectively, and both, sad to say, recently deceased.
15. A.C. Graham, Conceptual Schemes and Linguistic Relativism in Relation to Chinese, in CULTURE
AND MODERNITY: EAST-WEST PHILOSOPHIC PERSPECTIVES 193, 210 (Eliot Deutsch ed., 1991).
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intellectual history, Buddhist culture has theorized and practiced the
deconstruction of the self for the last 2500 years.
Part I of this Review discusses French's analysis of Tibetan law and its
implications for the assumptions underlying European law. Part U compares
her discoveries with my own work on ancient Indian and more recent
Southeast Asian Buddhism. I shall argue that what she found in Tibet is part
of a more extensive Buddhist legal culture, and that what she identified as
Tibetan challenges to European law are therefore of even wider import. I
discuss Peerenboom's critique of the silk manuscripts' natural law
jurisprudence in Part II. In Part IV, I consider what we can hope to learn by
comparing the Tibetan and Chinese legal cultures, while in Part V, I offer an
alternative to Peerenboom's use of natural law as a comparative tool. In
conclusion, I return to French's challenges to our understanding of European
law.
I. TIBETAN LAW
A. Historical Context and Methodology of French's Work
The Golden Yoke addresses the legal system of Tibet under the Dalai
Lama, "the last medieval legal system in existence in the middle of the
twentieth century."16 Since 1959, the Dalai Lama (currently in his fourteenth
incarnation) continues his activities from exile in the north Indian hill-station
of Dharamsala."7 Before 1959, he held high political office almost
continuously since 1641.' s Thus he is a great deal more experienced than
other world leaders and a great deal older. He is also a god---the Tantric deity
Avalokitesvaral 9-but this does not impress Buddhists as much as it
impresses us. Indeed, it may be a disadvantage. Even the rarified air of Tibet
is too coarse for deities; in his ninth to his twelfth incarnations, the Dalai
Lama died before the age of twenty-two." Evidently he knows more than our
philosophy dreams of: Most postmodernists can share in the Dalai Lama's
assault on subjectivity, but none anticipated his radical deconstruction of
mortality.
When French started researching in the Himalayas in the early 1980s,
neither Tibet's legal history nor its legal anthropology had come into its own.
16. FRENCH, supra note 1, at xiii.
17. See generally TENIN GYATSO, FREEDOM IN EXILE: THE ArOBIOGRAPHY OF HIS HOuNESS THE
DALAi LAMA OF TIBEr (1990) (discussing fourteenth Dalai Lama's life and work).
18- See generally H.E. RICHARDSON, A SHORT HISTORY OF TIBET 41-205 (1962) (discussing ongins
and history of Lamaist state).
19. See GYATSO, supra note 17, at 11.
20. See MELVYN C. GOLDSTEIN, A HISTORY OF MODERN TIBET. 1913-1951. at 41 n.2 (1989) (noting
"ample reason to suspect that some of these Dalai Lamas were *encouraged' to leave their human form-)-
RICHARDSON, supra note 18, at 291-92 (providing dates of Dalai Lama's incanauons).
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Europeans have known of the existence of Tibetan "law codes," manuscripts
that set forth punishments and describe social institutions, since 1885.21 The
Dunhuang discoveries suggest that written Tibetan laws circulated as early as
the seventh century CE.22 Very little, however, has been published on the
dating and interrelation of the various legal manuscripts. Dieter Schuh
summarizes the present dilemma in Tibetan legal-historical research: Until the
codes we already know about have been edited and until there has been a
proper search for Tibetan law books of the medieval period, many questions
can only be answered hypothetically or must remain unsolved.23 French
intended, after returning to academia following some years in practice, to
conduct conventional anthropological research into dispute settlement in some
picture-postcard mountain village.24 Fortunately, her supervisor Leopold
Pospisil convinced her to undertake the more important work, the study of the
"last, great unknown legal system of Asia."'  Because this system became
history after 1959, Pospisil and French understood her task as a search for law
texts among the exile community."
We should expect The Golden Yoke to answer Schuh's dilemma by
discovering new legal manuscripts, linking them thematically to other law
texts, and interpreting them sympathetically so as to reconstruct the mentalitg
of the texts' authors. It does none of these things.27 Instead, it does something
far more important: It preserves Tibetan legal reasoning, the key to
understanding how people understood the legal literature. I use the phrase
"legal reasoning" to describe the complex relationship between what lawyers
do and the texts they use. "Lawyers," in turn, should be understood in an
inclusive sense, for Tibet's interpretative community was not organized into
21. See SARAT CHANDRA DAS, NARRATIVE OF A JOURNEY TO LHASA IN 1881-82 app. at 23-33
(Calcutta, Bengal Secretariat Press 1885) (unpublished intelligence report, on file with the India Office
Library, London). An edited version of Das's report, which does not include the appendix's material on
Tibetan law, was published as SARAT CHANDRA DAS, JOURNEY TO LHASA AND CENTRAL TIBET (W.W.
Rockhill ed., 1902).
22. See FRENCH, supra note 1, at 41, 352 n.l (noting existence of code found at Dunhuang and
attributed to reign of first historical Tibetan king in seventh century CE but also containing elements from
eighth or ninth century CE); Hugh Richardson, Early Tibetan Law Concerning Dog-Bite, 3 BULL.
TIBETOLOGY (n.s.) 5, 5 (1989) (noting that Tibetan chronicle from Dunhuang refers to code established by
eighth or ninth century CE).
23. See Dieter Schuh, Recht und Gesetz in Tibet, in 2 TIBETAN AND BUDDHIST STUDIES
(COMMEMORATING THE 200TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE BIRTH OF ALEXANDER CSOMA DE KOROS) 291, 311
(Louis Ligeti ed., 1984). My thanks to Dr. Christoph COppers for translating the relevant part of this essay.
See Letter from Christoph Ctippers, Representative Director, Lumbini International Research Institute,
Lumbini, Nepal, to Andrew Huxley, Lecturer in the Laws of Southeast Asia, School of Oriental and African
Studies, University of London 1 (Jan. 8, 1994) (on file with author).
24. See FRENCH, supra note 1, at 8.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 8-9.
27. French's next book will be legal-historical in this sense. She has evidently collected some
important new legal manuscripts. See id. at 12; see also Rebecca R. French, Tibetan Legal Literature: The
Law Codes of the dGa' ldan pho brang, in TIBETAN LITERATURE 438 (Josd lgnacio Cabez6n & Roger R.
Jackson eds., 1996).
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a legal profession. They were, literally, legal amateurs: They read the law texts
for love rather than money. Max Weber called such amateur proto-lawyers
honoratiores (well-respected men) and regarded them as the authors of legal
reasoning and thus of legal culture. 8 In this context, then, legal reasoning is
not the mental processes that resolve a hard case, but the hermeneutic that
proto-lawyers apply to legal literature. It passes between the generations as an
implicit part of legal education, but because it is never fully articulated, it is
at great risk of being lost. Should the institutions of legal education be
destroyed, that culture's legal reasoning will vanish beyond recovery within a
generation. 29 Left to their own devices, the Tibetan lawyers would eventually
have mutated into professionals, 3 but before this could happen, the Chinese
chased them into exile. At the heart of French's book lie her two years of
intensive study with one of these men. She qualified (thirty years after the
legal system had ceased to exist) as the last of the pre-1959 honoratiores3'
and surely the first femina honoratior among Tibetans. 32 This places her on
the methodological frontier between legal history (because her work is
concerned with understanding legal manuscripts), legal anthropology (because
she learned how to understand the manuscripts through oral discussion with
indigenous informants), and comparative law (because she followed the classic
comparative law strategy of qualifying as a lawyer in the system to be
studied).
Kungola Thubten Sangye (1910-1989) was French's guru.33 He is, in a
sense, one of three coauthors of The Golden Yoke:3 French the pupil,
Kungola the teacher, and the intellectual traditions of Kungola's teachers from
Tibet's administrative elite. His life story3s typifies Weber's "well-respected
man." The exam that he passed at eighteen to join the Dalai Lama's
government tested his handwriting-his proficiency in the three styles of
script-rather than his legal knowledge. 36 Nor did his jobs as local
administrator, as diplomatic representative in China, or as governor of southern
Tibet require any specialist knowledge of law (although it served as a useful
28. See MAX WEBER, LA IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 198-223.332-35 (Max Rhcmstein ed., Edward
Shils & Max Rheinstein trans., 1954). The second of the four stages of the general development of law and
procedure is that of the honoratiores, "'i.e. law creation through cautelary jurisprudence and adherence to
precedent." Id. at 303.
29. This happened in Burma after 1885, when the British abolished the Burmese legal profession. See
Andrew Huxley, The Burmese Legal Profession 1250-1885, 63 RECuEiLs DE LA SOCtt JE,; BODIN
(forthcoming Oct. 1997).
30. Cf FRENCH, supra note 1, at 245 (noting that in major Tibetan cities, weaker parues could employ
representatives to plead their cases in court, but such practice did not result in formtation of disunct
profession).
31. See id at 10-11 (describing French's Tibetan law educauon).
32. Cf id. at 31-32 (describing women's limited role in Tibetan legal and political systems)
33. An earlier generation of anthropologists would have called him her native informant.
34. See FRENCH, supra note 1, at xiv, 11.
35. See id. at 327-39.
36. See id. at 332.
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bonus).37 As he put it: "Officials in the government all knew that there was
a standard code .... Some people took an interest in the law codes and some
didn't., 38 His interest was both textual, in that he collected and edited law
codes,39 and practical, in that he acquired a reputation as a wise judge during
his stints in eastern and southern Tibet.40 French won her race against time,
but barely: Kungola died while the book was still in draft.
41
French became habituated to the Tibetan supernatural. She writes soberly
about phenomena such as wish-fulfilling stones, 42 a Buddha image that comes
to life to frustrate a deer hunter,43 and a state oracle who plays a major role
in the deliberations of the government in exile."4 Even when she could vouch
for the miraculous herself, as when Kungola successfully dream-predicted the
unexpected arrival of her husband John, she learned to treat it as routine: "[I]n
the absence of telephones or other communication I began to rely on [Kungola]
to let me know of John's whereabouts." 45
Perhaps the greatest Tibetan mystery of the twentieth century is why its
history slipped out of sync with the rest of the world. Its premodern system of
law and government survived until 1959, at least seventy years longer than the
premodern systems of Buddhist Southeast Asia. This system was ousted by a
classic act of nineteenth-century colonialism that occurred precisely as the
winds of change were blowing European colonialism out of Africa and Asia.
French alludes only briefly to the violence that Tibet has suffered since
1959,46 but the whole tone of her book is necessarily elegiac. Dharamsala, the
locus of most of her research, is, for all its research libraries and conference
centers, still a refugee camp at heart. Her most important informants were
refugees, whose dearest wish was for circumstances to change sufficiently to
enable them to return to Lhasa. She had to contend, therefore, with a double
exile in place and time. Her informants were nostalgic for a place they had not
seen for thirty years and for a time when they were thirty years younger. Were
we presented with a memoir of Fulgencio Batista's Cuba based on interviews
with the exile community in Miami, we would take it with a pinch of salt.
How can the pangs of double exile be prevented from turning the reality of the
37. See id. at 334-36.
38. Id. at 336.
39. See id. at 9.
40. See id. at 335, 339.
41. See id. at 342. Tibet's loss may turn out to be America's gain. At one of their last meetings,
Kungola told her that he had dreamed his next rebirth would be to an American woman. See id. at 341.
Allowing for the normal amount of time spent in bardo between births, see id. at 11, he should be applying
for admission to law school around the year 2010. Were he and French then to collaborate on an analysis
of American legal culture, their contribution to comparative law would be truly unique. But I am betraying
my delight that Tibet is still home to the miraculous.
42. See i at 337.
43. See id. at 336.
44. See i. at 48.
45. Id. at 10.
46. See i.d at 50.
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past into an idealized fiction? 7 French's answer is to shift the interpretative
burden onto us. She presents information not as hard nuggets of empirical
evidence, but as narratives for us to interpret. Her informants become
autobiographical storytellers, and it falls to us to decide whether each of them
has added his own slant to a true story, or has made the whole thing up. She
suspends her anthropology of law within an anthropology of memory, in which
we have to choose whom to trust.4 s Of course, French's own interpretation
is present within her work, coded into her presentation of the stories."9 The
Golden Yoke is an Arabian Nights50 in which "each narrative is layered on
the last, reconstituted by the next."5' Yet French does not thrust her views
upon us; she leaves plenty of space for alternative readings. When, for
example, Chen Kuiyuan, the First Secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, reads The Golden Yoke, he will
be free to treat these narratives as examples of bad faith or false consciousness,
of feudal mentalities failing to adjust to the modern world. Therefore, he can
cling to his belief that the Dalai Lama's rule was an obscurantist
oppression. 2
B. Consensus and Karma in Tibetan Law
Let us look in detail at one aspect of Tibetan law that the Chinese
authorities and the exile community will interpret differently. A fourteenth-
century code53 indicates that the trustworthy, the virtuous, and the rich are
47. For a discussion of the difficulties of relying on Tibetan exiles' oral histoncal accounts, sec
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 20, at xxi-xxiii.
48. Her strategy's success is a credit to Vladimir Nabokov. The twentieth century's master of the
unreliable narrator was also our supreme novelist of exile. He habituated us to read nostalgia uith
suspicion. See, e.g., VLADIMIR NABOKOV, PALE FIRE (1962).
49. See FRENCH, supra note 1. at 346 ("Narratives ... are the primary presentation form in the book
because Tibetans spoke about law in the form of stories with exegeses. But we can hear stones only when
we already know the range of possible meanings, the correct formats, and their possible interpretive
contexts.").
50. THE ARABIAN NIGHTS (Muhsin Mahdi ed. & Husain Haddawy trans., 1990).
51. FRENCH, supra note I, at 347.
52. Two Chinese scholars give a typical statement of the Chinese Communist view of Lamaist Tibet:
"As is well known, Tibetan feudal serfdom was a reactionary, dark social system characterized by cruelty
and brutality." WANG FUREN & SUO WENQING. HIGHIUGIHTS OF TIBETAN HISTORY 43 (Xu Jian trans..
1984); see also A. TOM GRUNFELD, THE MAKING OF MODERN TIBET 2 (1987) (describing Chunesc
Communist view of Tibetan "feudalism"). For an account of the Chinese government's intensified hostility
towards Tibetan Buddhism since 1994, see TIBET INFO. NErVORK & HUMAN RIGHTS WATcH/AsIA.
CUTTING OFFTHE SERPFNT'S HEAD: TIGHTENING CONTROL IN TIBET. 1994-1995. at 235-34. 52-70 (1996)
53. 1 should explain that the Tibetan codes are not primarily collections of substanuve rules. Much
of their text describes institutions and the behavior appropriate to insuiutional settings. They contain details
of law court procedure and of the skills a judge needs to distinguish liar from truth-teller, good citizen from
freeloader. See FRENCH, supra note 1, at 43. French refers to this as their "prudential or admonitory style."
Id. Prudential or wisdom-based legal codes tend to link questions of status with questions of
trustworthiness. Ernest Gellner, generalizing Sir Henry Maine's insight into premodern la. see HeRY
SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 163-65 (Ashley Montagu ed.. 1986). contends that "'[iln stable, complex.
agrarian societies," culture's "main role is to indicate and confirm men's status." Ernest Gellner. What Do
We Need Now?, TIMES LITERARY SUPP. (London), July 16. 1993. at 3. Gellner has not gone on record as
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overlapping categories. 4 French summarizes the relevant passage of the
Tibetan code as follows:
[A] party to a suit who is distinguished by "high victorious speech"
should display at least some of the Four Causes of Greatness
(greatness in the heritage of paternal ancestors, greatness in acts for
the country, learning, and great wealth); the Four Signs of Greatness
(presenting tea and beer, wearing silk, lynx, or fox, using a zo [a
crossbreed of a yak and a cow] and having important guests from a
long distance); and the Four Qualities of Greatness (taking on a guru,
taking care of one's parents, taking care of one's relatives and
servants, and vanquishing enemies easily).
55
The Chinese Party Secretary would surely give a class-based critique of this
passage:56 "It's the rich whose 'high, victorious speech' prevails in court; it's
the poor what gets the blame." French invites us to take a less harsh view. We
should understand such passages in the light of two deep aspects of Tibetan
legal culture. The first is the fundamental role of consensus in legal
proceedings, which means that the poor must agree to take the blame. 7 Like
Barnardine in Measure for Measure, they can stave off their execution by
saying, "I will not consent to die this day, that's certain." 58 When punishment
depends on the consent of the punished, a Marxist-Leninist view of law as
power exercised by the dominant class59 cannot tell the whole story. We
would have to draw on Neo-Marxist accounts to understand how the poor,
against their obvious self-interest, could be persuaded to give the necessary
consent.60 This would be one way to understand Tibetan norms (the amalgam
of religion, law, and time-tested social institutions that French describes).
Unlike other ethical systems that provide decision procedures for complex
sharing Maine's rather overheated desire to "penetrate as far up as we could in the history of primitive
societies." MAINE, supra, at 115.
54. See FRENCH, supra note 1, at 43.
55. Id.
56. Cf WANG & Suo, supra note 52, at 49-52 (describing Tibetan Buddhism as tool of feudal class
exploitation).
57. See FRENCH, supra note I, at 345.
58. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE act 4, sc. 3, II. 54-55 (J.W. Lever cd., 1965);
cf FRENCH, supra note 1, at 302-03 (describing murder case in which accused's persistent denial of guilt
led to lengthy detention without adjudication of guilt, because judges refused to resolve factual disputes
until testimony of accusers and accused agreed).
59. See KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS, MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (1848), reprinted
in I SELECTED WORKS 33, 49 (1962) (arguing that bourgeois "jurisprudence is but the will of (the
bourgeois] class made into a law for all, a will, whose essential character and direction are determined by
the economical conditions of existence of [the bourgeois] class").
60. See, e.g., Alan Hunt, Marxist Theory of Law, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND
LEGAL THEORY 355, 361 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996) ("The dominant ideology is the prevailing influence
which forms the 'common sense' of the period and thus appears natural, normal, and right .... (and]
cement[s] together the social formation under the leadership of the dominant class; it is this process which
Gramsci called hegemony.") (citing ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF
ANTONIO GRAMSCI (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds., 1971)).
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moral situations, these norms' function was to persuade people to take
responsibility for their own actions by consenting to be punished.
The second presumption, the doctrine of karma,6' means that, as a rule
of thumb, the rich will indeed be more likely to tell the truth than the poor.
Wealth and happiness in this life are signs of high moral standing in previous
lives.62 To be born with such an accumulation of good karma will predispose
(but not predetermine) one to accrue more good karma in this life.63 In other
words, Tibetans' concept of moral agency is very different from that of
Europeans. The moral beings of the Tibetan law codes differ from our
atomistic threescore-years-and-ten individuals; they are equipped with several
lifetimes of relevant history, and their past and future rebirths significantly
affect their present moral position.6 The same understanding of individuality
would be used to answer J.M. Balkin's questions about legal subjectivity:
"What do [legal subjects] bring to the task of legal understanding? What
characteristics of subjectivity produce their judgments of legal coherence?
'"6
Good karma accumulated in previous rebirths will predispose the legal subject
to see deeper and further into the nature of law. In Tibetan terms, French's
guru was probably a good lawyer just because he rose high in the Tibetan
bureaucracy from relatively humble beginnings. His meritocratic success
demonstrated his accumulation of good karma and thus his potential for deep
understanding.
French's explanations of what Tibetan law looks like from within will
leave Chinese officials' consciences undisturbed. Their presence in Tibet rests
ultimately on the Chinese claim to have replaced the medieval with the modem
and thus to be acting on the side of history.66 This claim can only be met by
the retort that being born modem, or achieving that state, is morally
distinguishable from having modernity thrust upon one.
61- Karma is "the residue... accumulated [from past deeds) that conditions both the voliional present
and the future lives of a human being. A person's acts produce karma, both good and bad, which affects
his or her chances for enlightenment." FRENCHl, supra note I. at 36.
62. See id. at 109 (noting hierarchical, stratified nature of Tibetan society and belief that officials were
"born into their excellent situations as a result of karma").
63. See id. at 63 ("[E]very act done by anyone at any time is the result of both prevtous karma and
the present possible exercise of will .
64. See id at 63-64.
65. J.M. Balkin, Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and the Problem of Legal
Coherence, 103 YALE L.J. 105, 122 (1993).
66. See STEvEN LUKES, MARXISM AND MORALITY 44 (1985) (discussing Karl Marx's belief that
imperialism could serve as progressive historical force); KARl. MARX. The British Rule in India. N.Y
DAILY TRIB., June 25, 1853, reprinted in I MARX & ENGELS, supra note 59. at 345. 351 ("England. itis
true, in causing a social revolution in Hindostan, was actuated only by the vilest interests, and was stupid
in her manner of enforcing them .... [Yet] whatever may have been the crimes of England she was the
unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution.")' TIBET LTFO. NE'\ORK & HUMAN RIGHTS
WATcH/ASIA, supra note 52, at 43 ("'[By] recallfing] past suffering and think[mg) over the source of
present happiness, and by comparing between the old and new society, we should let the young generation
have the knowledge of the dark serf system and to see the Dalai clique's true color') (quoting Tibet
Autonomous Region Communist Party Deputy Secretary Ragdi).
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C. European Law Through Tibetan Eyes
Once we have judged the credibility of French's narratives, we can
consider her conclusions. Writing the book has enabled her to "think more
deeply about our own unacknowledged assumptions and the possibly
contingent nature of what we assume to be essential in our cosmology of
law."67 These are the final words in The Golden Yoke. They imply that one
reason we should understand Tibetan law is so that our own legal tradition will
appear strange to us. A distinguished civil lawyer noted that the only way
European legal culture can become intelligible as a cultural entity is in contrast
to other, chiefly Asiatic high cultures, "among them, as the ones reaching
farthest in time and space, those of the Islamic world, India, and China. These,
above all, present a challenge to Europeans to become conscious of the
peculiar nature and the limitations of their own conception of law."68 Or as
Michael Anderson put it in his review of a decade of work on Indian law: "If
successful, a comparative approach should serve to undermine ethnocentric
notions of social ordering and stimulate a debate-somewhere between
philosophy and anthropology-on the nature of justice. ' 69 French clearly
specifies those aspects of Tibetan law from which we must learn. The final
pages of her book list eight challenges.70 Only when we have considered how
our own legal culture can answer these questions will we have understood
Tibetan law properly. In listing these eight challenges, I have in some cases
paraphrased French rather broadly and added my own examples and spin. I
have done so because I share her polemical desire to shock the academically
inclined common lawyer into reexamining what has hitherto seemed obvious.
French's first challenge is to European dualisms: "Omnipresent
dualisms-good/bad, nature/culture, primitive/modern, religious/secular,
right/left, scholastic/scientific, faith/reason, public/private-permeate the
investigation, modeling, and presentation of Western material on legal
systems.",71 Tibetan Buddhism's combination of "radical particularity and
cosmological integration " " casts doubt on all these. How, if at all, can we
think without them? Europe, French notes in the second place, separates law
and morality by distinguishing law's minimum acceptable standard from
moralities of aspiration, which encourage us to attain the maximal standard.73
What happens if we collapse this European dualism and examine both
67. FRENCH, supra note 1, at 347.
68. Wieacker, supra note 7, at 4.
69. Michael R. Anderson, Classifications and Coercions: Themes in South Asian Legal Studies in the
1980s, 10 S. ASIA REs. 158, 162 (1990).
70. See FRENCH, supra note 1, at 343-46.
71. Id. at 343.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 343-44 (contrasting Tibetan law's permeation by Buddhist morality with "the separation
of law and morality in both Western and East Asian jurisprudence").
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normative systems together? How does society educate us into being virtuous
citizens? What happens to society if it can no longer do so? I shall combine
French's third and fourth points thus: In Buddhism, "faith and reason, logic
and compassion are all integ-rated. 74 Legal reasoning in such a system
eschews rule and precedent in favor of factors that act concurrently to
determine the unique situation.75 Some heterodox European lawyers, such as
the American Realists and the Critical Legal Studies movement, have argued
against the reification of rules and doctrine.76 Is this the same thing? Fifth,
we are too prone to demand finality in legal process.77 Is this connected with
our wish that truth should be guaranteed by some transcendent supertruth? The
sixth aspect French would have us consider is the continuing need for consent
to social institutions. 78 By way of analogy, if we lawyers breach professional
norms, we risk disbarment.79 We volunteer to be bound by our professional
code and can generally withdraw from it whenever we choose8s So it was
with the Vinaya (the Buddhist monastic code), which lies at the heart of
Buddhist legal culture.8' Although we cannot imagine a national legal system
working on such voluntarist principles, the Tibetans could. Their civil, and
even much of their criminal, process depended on the defendant's consent.'
In social contract language, the state remained bound, but the individual could
cancel his obligations at any time. Is this a satisfactory compromise between
anarchy and law? What changes would our culture have to undergo before it
would work for us? The seventh challenge asks, "Why dichotomize religious
law and secular law? '8 3 If you find it difficult to imagine religion without
God, you will be misled by calling Buddhism a religion. It is more like a
philosophy with a strong ethical element.' Such a description also applies to
74. Id. at 344.
75. See id
76. See generally Guyora Binder, Critical Legal Studies. in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPiY OF LAw
AND LEGAL THEORY, supra note 60, at 280 (arguing that Cntical Legal Studies extends Legal Realism by
demonstrating that not only legal rules, but also social and individual interests they protect. arc
indeterminate); Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAwV AND LEGAL
THEORY, supra note 60, at 261, 265-71 (describing Legal Realists* rule-skepucism): id. at 275-76
(describing Legal Realist critique of formalist faith in abstract legal principles).
77. See FRENCH, supra note 1, at 344-45 (contrasting -lack of finality and closure" in Tibetan law
with American law's stare decisis and res judicata "doctnnes of closure").
78. See id. at 345.
79. See CHARLES W. wOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcS § 3.5.4. at 128-31 (1986).
80. See id. at 131-32 (noting that lawyer may generally resign from bar. but resignation may not be
permitted or may be deemed admission if disciplinary charges are pending).
81. See MELFORD E. SPIRO, BUDDHISM AND SOCIETY 283 (1970) (noting that "monks may and do
freely enter and leave the Order").
82. See FRENCH, supra note 1, at 345.
83. Id. at 346.
84. This is so despite the worship of the Buddha and other divinities in popular Buddhism. The
Buddha is conceived of as one in a series of enlightened teachers who have instructed humanity on the
fundamental laws of causation and karma and the means of escaping ignorance, suffering, and rebirth, not
as an almighty ruler or creator of the universe like the God of theistic religions. See IEL .iTni vON
GLASENAPP, BUDDHISM-A NON-THEIs-nc RELIGION 63-64. 67-80 (Irmgard Schlocgl trans.. George
Braziller 1970) (1954). Similarly, the many lesser "gods" of Buddhism are mortal and are subject to the
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Stoicism, which wrote the first chapter in our own discussions of law."
Buddhist and European legal cultures therefore stand or fall together: Either
they are both secular, or both religious. Finally, the Pali Buddhist scriptures
use the same word for truth and for keeping one's promises.8 6 Morality and
epistemology are therefore inextricably mingled. In Tibet, "[a] final
understanding of truth, internal truth and morality, we would perhaps label
personal honesty., 87 Perhaps Europeans have overemphasized epistemological
techniques for proving the truth and underplayed our moral obligation to speak
the truth?
Thus the Tibetan Buddhist challenges our European legal assumptions.
While yoking together these eight points is novel, some of the issues are
already well entrenched on the law school agenda. The sixth question, for
example, raises the justification of state law, which has been the fundamental
issue of our political philosophy since Thomas Hobbes and is currently debated
among liberals, communitarians, and postmodernists. 8  Tibet enlivens this
debate by exemplifying a hitherto unknown compromise between the pragmatic
need for state law and the anarchist claim that man is born free. The second
question provides a Buddhist angle on the contemporary debate between virtue
ethicists and natural law theorists.89 The first and eighth questions impinge
on postmodernist topics: the wrong turn our epistemologists took three
centuries ago, the connection between this and our propensity for dualistic
thinking, and the problems inherent in the Cartesian dualism of mind and
matter.90 Does it follow that Tibetan Buddhism advocated what we would call
anarchism, virtue theory, and postmodernism? I shall shortly turn to the
relationship between Buddhism and anarchism. 91 It seems plausible that
Buddhism promotes virtue, an ongoing process of moral improvement, rather
than adherence to a minimum moral standard, because there is evidence of a
distinct Buddhist hostility to standards and rules. 92 As for postmodernism, an
assertion of common ground with Buddhism seems less convincing, given
laws of causation and karma. See idl at 30. For a discussion of karma, see supra notes 61-64 and
accompanying text; for a discussion of Buddhist causation, see infra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
85. See infra text accompanying notes 323-30.
86. See I.B. Homer, Introduction to TEN JATAKA STORIES at vii, xix (I.B. Homer trans., 1957) ("By
sacca, truth, is to be understood the keeping of one's word and promise rather than actual truth-spcaking.
Nevertheless the animals [in Sacca Jataka] spoke the truth when they made and later redeemed their
promises.").
87. FRENCH, supra note I, at 346.
88. See James Buchanan, Report on the Seventh East-West Philosophers' Conference, "Justice and
Democracy: A Philosophical Exploration", 46 PHIL. E. & W. 309, 316-18 (1996).
89. For a discussion of virtue and natural law as theories of human conduct, see Russell Hittinger,
Natural Law and Virtue: Theories at Cross Purposes, in NATURAL LAW THEORY 42 (Robert P. George ed.,
1992).
90. See Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL
THEORY, supra note 60, at 375, 376-80.
91. See infra notes 158-69 and accompanying text.
92. See infra notes 174-82 and accompanying text.
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postmodernism's hostility to grand narratives,93 and given that the cessation
of suffering and the achievement of nirvana9" are as grand a narrative as one
could wish for. I shall return to this issue in Part IV. Meanwhile, I intend to
broaden French's challenges to European law in two directions. In the next
Part, I argue that what she has found in the Dalai Lama's Tibet is a
manifestation of Buddhism in its oldest form known to us. I then turn in Part
mH to the single great legal culture of South and East Asia that was
demonstrably not influenced by Buddhism to determine whether Han Dynasty
law poses some of the same challenges as Buddhist law.
II. PALI BUDDHISM
A. The Buddhist Sects
Tibetan Buddhism is the youngest of the three main Buddhist traditions
that are still practiced. The first Tibetan ordination of a monk took place in the
eighth century CE.95 The Tantric texts that are distinctive to Tibetan
Buddhism were brought from the Pala kingdom (in present-day Bengal and
Bihar) in the eighth to twelfth century CE and from Kashmir in the tenth to
eleventh century.96 French is clear that the ultimate source of Tibet's legal
cosmology is Buddhist,97 but she does not compare her Tibetan findings with
the approach to law found in earlier Buddhist traditions. In this Part, I shall
place her data within a wider geography and an older history. The second
oldest living Buddhist tradition can be called "Chinese Buddhism," though it
also spread to Korea in 372 CE 98 and thence to Japan in 552 CE.99 The
Mahayana'tu texts distinctive to this tradition were written in the first five
93. On the postmodem critique of grand narratives, see JEAN-FRAgotIS LYOTARD. THE POSTIODER.,
CONDMON 18-23 (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans.. Univ. Minn. Press 1984) (1979).
94. Nirvana, the attainment of which is the goal of Buddhism, is "'an indescribable state of awareness
that is not death, annihilation, or eternalism.... When the fire of ignorance and craving is gone. a person
is fully 'blown out' and henceforth has sensations but is not drawn to them. This is mrvana." FReicit.
supra note 1, at 36.
95. See SiR CHARLES BELL, THE RELIGION OF T1BET 37-38 (1931).
96. See BUDDHISM: ART AND FArH 104-05 (N. Zwalf ed.. 1985); 3 VALRAE REYNOLDS ETr AL.
CATALOGUE OF THE NEWARK MUSEUM TIBETAN COLLECTION: SCUL'TURE AND PAINTING 17-19 (2d ed.
1986).
97. See FRENCH, supra note 1, at 343 (describing Tibetan legal system as "thoroughly Buddhist-).
98. See BUDDHISM: ART AND FAITH, supra note 96. at 235; J.N. Takasaki. Korea and Japan. in 2500
YEARS OF BUDDHISM 69, 69 (P.V. Bapat ed., 1959).
99. See Takasaki, supra note 98, at 70.
100. The Mahayana or "Great Vehicle" is the Buddhist sect prevalent in Cluna. Nepal, Mongolia.
Japan, and Korea. Tibetan Buddhism, known as Vajrayana (Thunderbolt or Diamond Vehicle). Mantrayana
(Spell Vehicle), or Tantrayana (Ritual Vehicle), is sometimes regarded as a subsect of the Mahayana and
sometimes as a third Way along with the Theravada and Mahayana. See TEI"7j. GYATSO (TUHE
FOURTEENTH DALAI LAMA), THE BUDDHISM OF TIBET AND THE KEY TO TIlE MIDDLE WAY 29-30 (Jeffrey
Hopkins & Lati Rimpoche trans., 1975); 3 REYNOLDS ET AL. supra note 96. at 28: Richard Gombnch.
Buddhism in Ancient India: The Evolution of the Sangha. in RICHARD GO.MBRICH E AL. THE WORLD OF
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centuries CE in India.'0 ' I shall refer to the oldest of the three traditions,
whose contemporary practitioners may be found in Sri Lanka and Southeast
Asia, as "Pali Buddhism."'2 Its scriptures, acknowledged by Tibetan and
Chinese traditions as the oldest, reached something close to their present form
by the first century BCE.'0 3 Pali, an Indo-European language, is related to
what was spoken at King Asoka's court in Magadha (in present-day Bihar) in
the third century BCE, but Pali seems, like Homeric Greek, to be a composite
dialect designed specifically to preserve a particular body of texts."I While
the Asokan inscriptions confirm that some of the Pali scriptures were well
known in third-century Magadha,'05 attempts to prove the authenticity of
their oral transmission from the Buddha's lifetime down to Asoka's reign
founder on the total absence of evidence independent of the scriptures
themselves. Indeed, there is still a lively debate over whether the Buddha was
born in 563, 485, or 450 BCE.'0 6 The Pali scriptures that are regarded as
canonical'0 7 form a library about twenty times the length of the Christian
Bible. Unless spectacular new discoveries are made,'08 attempts to present
"what the real Buddha actually taught" will continue to lack historical
persuasiveness. 9 Nonetheless, the Pali canon, though removed by as much
as five centuries from the Buddha's lifetime, remains the starting point for any
investigation of early Buddhism.
B. The Buddhist Order and Its Monastic Code
The Pali scriptures give conceptual priority to the most legalistic of their
BUDDHISM 77, 86-87 (Heinz Bechert & Richard Gombrich eds., 1984). On the Theravada, see infra note
102 and accompanying text.
101. See Gregory Schopen, Deaths, Funerals, and the Division of Property in a Monastic Code, in
BUDDHISM IN PRACTICE 473, 476 (Donald S. Lopez, Jr. ed., 1995).
102. This is the sect known as the Theravada or "Doctrine of the Elders," sometimes derogatorily
called the Hinayana or "Lesser Vehicle."
103. See K.R. Norman, The Pali Language and Scriptures, in THE BUDDHIST HERITAGE 29, 37
(Tadeusz Skorupski ed., 1989).
104. See 0. VON HINOBER, The Oldest Literary Language of Buddhism, in SELECTED PAPERS ON PALl
STUDIES 177, 193-94 (1994) (arguing that Pali and Buddhist Sanskrit descended from "Buddhist Middle
Indic," which, like Homeric Greek, was literary lingua franca disconnected from regional vernaculars).
105. See Gombrich, supra note 100, at 82-83.
106. See ANDREW SKILTON (DHARMACARI STHIRAMATI), A CONCISE HISTORY OF BUDDHISM 19
(1994).
107. Pali Buddhists have been deeply concerned with questions of canonicity and exclusion. See
generally Steven Collins, On the Very Idea of the Pali Canon, 15 J. PALl TEXT SOc'Y 89 (1990) (arguing
that Pali Canon is not pre-Theravada corpus of Early Buddhist texts, but rather is product of deliberate
canon formation by Theravada in first few centuries CE).
108. I fear that the recently announced discovery of Buddhist manuscripts from Afghanistan or
northern Pakistan dating to the end of the first or start of the second century CE will not be spectacular
enough for these purposes. See Dalya Alberge, The Buddhist Scrolls: Buddhist 'Dead Sea Scrolls' Found
by Library, TIMES (London), June 26, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File; British
Library Acquires Buddhist 'Dead Sea Scrolls', L.A. TIMES, July 13, 1996, at B5.
109. See Steven Collins, The Lion's Roar on the Wheel-Turning King: A Response to Andrew Huxley's
"The Buddha and the Social Contract", 24 J. INDIAN PHIL. 421, 422 (1996).
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texts.1 The Vinaya, which contains rules about the behavior of monks and
the institutional capacities of the monastery, comes first of the three scriptural
subdivisions."' The early Orientalist scholars who focused on "sutras and
philosophical texts rather than on community-directed vinaya texts and their
commentaries"'" 2 obscured this strong legal element. We are now belatedly
recognizing that India produced a Buddhist, as well as a Hindu, law. Duncan
Derrett, who has devoted most of his career to investigating the Hindu
tradition, regards the Buddhist monks as more sophisticated lawyers than the
Hindu sastris:t 3
It is a pity that the juridical ability indirectly available to the sastris
from the works of their Buddhist and conceivably also their Jaina
colleagues was not utilised [in the dharnmasastras or ancient Hindu
law texts] or even reflected .... [Flurther investigation [is needed]
of what Buddhist scholars were thinking and how far they solved
problems which Hindu writers are in general content to pass over in
their surviving treatises."
4
I would add to this that the Buddhist legal culture enshrined in the Vinava has
influenced much more of Asia than the Hindu legal culture of the
dharmasastras.
The Buddha created an institution, the community of monks, whose
function was to facilitate enlightenment. Members of the institution depended
on the charity of nonmembers for their daily bread, but had to compete with
others who might claim to be more ascetic or better magicians. The new
institution needed a brand identity to position it within this charity market and
an organizational flowchart to get things done. The Vinaya met both these
needs." 5 The recension of the Vinaya in Pali, like the other four that have
survived in full," 6 is organized around a common normative core, which has
110. See CHARLEs S. PREBISH, A SURVEY OF VINAYA LITERATURE at viii (Dharma Lamp Senes No
1, Charles S. Prebish ed., 1994).
11I. See Oskar von Hinuber, Buddhist Law According to the Therarada-Vinaya: A Survey of Theory
and Practice, 18 J. INT'L ASS'N BUDDHIST STUD. 7. 8 (1995).
112. Frank Reynolds, Buddhism and Law-Preface. 18 J. INT*L ASS'N BUDDHIST STUD. 1. 3 (1995).
Sutras (sutas in Pali) are doctrinal texts believed to be discourses of the Buddha. See SKILTON. supra note
106, at 79-83.
113. The sastris are the scholars of the sastra or Hindu sacred texts.
114. J. Duncan M. Derrett, Adanadanam: Valuable Buddhist Casuistry. 7 INDOLOGICA TAURINENSIA
181, 194 (1979). These comments follow his comparison of Hindu and Buddhist legal learning in an area
that is a good test of legal sophistication: how complex ideas of ownership anse out of the defenses rased
to a charge of theft. See id. at 181-86.
115. See G.S.P. MISRA, THE AGE OF VINAYA 21-22, 111 (1972).
116. See PREBISH, supra note 110, at 46, 56, 70. 84. Of these the Dharmagupta is used by Chinese
Buddhists, and the Mula-Sarnastivada by Tibetans. See BHIKSUNI JAMPA TSEDROEN. A BRIEF SURVEY OF
THE VINAYA 26-28 (1992). Compare I.TtENNE LAMOTE, HISTORY OF INDIAN BUDDHISM FROM THiE
ORIGINS TO THE SAKA ERA 165-71 (Publications de l'Institut Onentaliste de Louvain No. 36. Institut
Orientaliste, Universit6 Catholique de Louvain, Sara Webb-Boin trans.. 1988) (1958) (analyzing structure
of different recensions, discussing their compilation and translation at different dates, and arguing that they
represent divergent scholastic traditions), with Charles S. Prebish. Recent Progress in Vina)va Studies, in
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grown out of two very early lists. The Patimokkha lists 227 activities that a
monk must avoid on pain of penalty, the four most serious being murder, theft,
sex, and boasting of one's spiritual achievements." 7 The Kammavaca lists
a series of formulae by which the monks living within a particular sima
(parish) can make collegiate decisions, for example, to ordain a new monk or
expel an old one."18 The Vinaya is divided into the Suttavibhanga, which
expounds the Patimokkha, and the twenty chapters of the Khandaka, which
expound the Kammavaca."9 In our terms, then, half of the Vinaya concerns
misdemeanors that an individual monk should avoid, and the other half
explains monastic constitutional and administrative law.
When the canon was committed to writing around the last century BCE,
it froze the legal developments that had taken place during Buddhism's first
few centuries. The written version, known subsequently as the Vinayapali,
reveals developments that are unmistakably legal. First, the most important
Patimokkha rules were equipped with their own "casebooks" recounting
decisions in borderline cases. 20 Second, every word of the definition of each
rule was glossed and analyzed in an exhaustive exercise in statutory
interpretation.' 2' Third, a body of legal specialists called vinayadharas had
emerged, tracing their discipline back to Upali, whom the Buddha appointed
as his specialist in Vinaya matters. 122 An important part of their function was
to memorize the Vinayapali text, 123 but they were also called on to settle
disputes as to what the text might mean. 24 As they did not ply their skills
for hire and could not be paid in anything other than prestige, we cannot
describe them as a legal profession.' 25 However, they fit very neatly into
Weber's category of honoratiores. Unfortunately, Vinaya studies had not
progressed sufficiently by the turn of the century for Weber to realize this.
Hence, he made dogmatic statements that, with hindsight, are simply wrong:
STUDIES IN PALl AND BUDDHISM 297, 298-99 (A.K. Narain ed., 1979) (arguing that doctrinal differences,
not disputes over Vnaya, accounted for Buddhist sectarianism, but only sects with vigorous Vinaya
traditions endured).
117. See OSKAR VON HINOBER, A HANDBOOK OF PALl LrrERATURE 9-12 (Indian Philology & S.
Asian Stud. No. 2, Albrecht Wezler & Michael Witzel eds., 1996); von HinUber, supra note 11, at 8-9;
see also FRENCH, supra note 1, at 41-42 (noting that these four prohibitions were adopted directly from
Tibetan Buddhist canon into Tibetan codes as "the Four Fundamental Laws").
118. See SKILTON, supra note 106, at 75-76; VON HINOBER, supra note 117, at 15-17.
119. See SKILTON, supra note 106, at 76-77; VON HINOBER, supra note 117, at 13-17.
120. See VON HINOBER, supra note 117, at 13.
121. See id.
122. See Andrew Huxley, The Vinaya. Legal System or Performance-Enhancing Drug?, in 4
BUDDHIST FORUM 141, 153, 162 (Tadeusz Skorupski ed., 1996) (discussing Upali); von Hintlber, supra
note 111, at 28 (discussing vinayadharas).
123. See SUKUMAR DuTT, THE BUDDHA AND FIVE AFrER-CENTURIES 92, 99 (1957).
124. See UMA CHAKRAVARTI, THE SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF EARLY BUDDHISM 131 (1987) (noting that
"[elven in the lifetime of the Buddha, Upali was sometimes called upon to give his judgment on disputes").
125. The thirty-seventh of the 227 Patimokkha rules forbids monks from handling gold and silver
(which is usually taken to mean any form of money). See 2 THE BOOK OF THiE DISCIPLINE (VINAYA-
PITAKA): (SUTFAVIBHANGA) 99-105 (I.B. Homer trans., 1940). The thirty-ninth rule forbids them from
engaging in trade. See id. at 109-12.
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"Yet even the relatively worldly ethics of Buddhism was so preoccupied with
conscience on the one hand and ritual formalism on the other that a system of
sacred 'law' could scarcely develop as the subject matter of a specialized
learning."26
This Buddhist legal tradition continues to flourish.' 2 7 Developments
during the last two millenia can be split into three periods. From the first to
the sixth century CE was the age of commentary, culminating in the
encyclopedic Samantapasadika ("The Thoroughly Inspiring"). ' s This work,
attributed to the great commentator Buddhaghosa, defines Pali Buddhism. One
is a Theravada Buddhist (a follower of the Doctrine of the Elders) if and only
if one submits to its interpretations. A measure of its global influence is that
it was translated into Chinese within a century' -9 and translated into Japanese
a little later. 30 From the seventh to the fourteenth century CE was the age
of subcommentary, culminating in three extant works giving rival
interpretations of the Sanztapasadika 31 By this stage, for which Pali
Buddhist sources can be checked against other accounts, it is clear that
disputed vinayadhara lineages best explain the constant splits and occasional
reunifications that divided the monkhood. Much of the subcommentarial
discussion takes the form: "The issue in dispute was A. -32 X's view was this,
and Y's view was that."'' 33 Usually it is not clear whether the dispute
concerned a hypothetical or a real case, but the consequences were real
enough: X's pupils and Y's pupils regarded each other as shameless monks
persisting in a misinterpretation of the Vinaya, and a new monastic lineage was
formed.' 34 The far end of the list is fixed ("Upali learned the Vinaya from
the Buddha, Dasaka learned it from Upali .. ),3 the middle is
126. WEBER, supra note 28, at 236.
127. The most recent published work by a vmayadhara of which I am aware emanates from
California. See THANISSARO BHIKKHU (GEOFFREY DEGRAFF). THE BUDDHIST MONASTIC CODE. THE
PATIMOKKHA TRAINING RULES TRANSLATED AND EXPLAINED (1994)
128. See VON HINOBER, supra note 117. at 103-09. The complete Pali text has not been translated into
English, but for an English translation of a Chinese translation, see P.V BAPAT & A. HIRAKAwA. SHAN-
CHIEN-P'I-P'O-SHA: A CHINESE VERSION BY SANGHABHADRA OF SAMAN-rAPASADIKA CoMME "rARY ON
PALl VINAYA TRANSLATED INro ENGLISH FOR THE FIRST TIME (1970).
129. See J. Takakusu, Pali Elements in Chinese Buddhism: A Translation of Buddhaghosas Samanta-
pasadika, a Commentary on the Vmaya, Found in the Chinese Tnpztaka. 28 J. ROYAL ASIATIC SOC'Y (n.s.)
415, 416 (1896).
130. See M. Nagai, Buddhist Vinaya Discipline or Buddhist Commandments, in BUDDHISTIC STUDIES
365, 368 (Bimala Chum Law ed., 1931).
131. See VON HINUBER, supra note 117, at 103. 159, 170-75.
132. See, e.g., BAPAT & H1RAKAWA, supra note 128. at 200-01 (posing and answenng question at
what stage of corporeal decomposition necrophilia becomes impossible).
133. Much as the vinayadharas' debates about the fine points of the monastic code produced a
tradition of commentary and subcommentary, the scholastic civil lawyers of Europe produced a rich
tradition of gloss and argument over the details of the Corpus urts Civilts. See. e.g., PETER STEIN.
REGULAE IlURis 158 (1966) (recounting story of Peter Abelard's boast that he could construe any provision
of Corpus luris Civilis and his rivals' mockery of his bafflement by obscure provision).
134. See Gombrich, supra note 100, at 82.
135. See, e.g., N.A. JAYAWICKRAMA, THE INCEPTION OF DISCIPLINE AND THE VINAYA NIDANA: BEING
A TRANSLATION AND EDITION OF THE BAHIRANIDANA OF BUDDHAGHOSA'S SAMANTAPASDIKA, THE
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negotiable, and the near end (whether one learned the Vinaya from X or Y) is
factual. From the fifteenth to the twentieth century has been the age of Vinaya
treatises, which are freestanding textbooks that break with the tradition of gloss
and subgloss. In the Pali Buddhist world, this has coincided with an increased
localization of Vinaya traditions. At the beginning of this century, a Thai monk
closely connected to the ruling family wrote a monumental Vinaya treatise," 6
which is immensely influential in Thailand but ignored in Burma. Burma's
own Vinaya literature since the seventeenth century has typically taken the
Wini Pyatton ("inaya Examples") form: "The decisions on controversial
Vinaya points of Thera [Elder] X."'37 Just how central these works were to
Burmese culture became clear at the turn of the century. Because the Burmese
had their own printing presses up and running before the final British invasion,
they were able to control which of their manuscripts should be preserved in
print. As soon as the British Judicial Commissioner for Upper Burma
commissioned a printed digest of Burmese secular law texts,138 the Burmese
responded with two digests of their recent Vinaya literature.39
C. The Monastic Code's Influence
If Buddhism was, as the Victorian poet Edwin Arnold put it, the Light of
Asia, Lux Asiae,140 then the Winaya has a good claim to be Lex Asiae. A
Vinaya text was first translated into Chinese around 250 CE,'4' but the
Chinese did not have a complete Vinaya until the late fourth or early fifth
VINAYA COMMENTARY 55-56 (1962).
136. 1 KROM PHRAYA VAJIRANANAVARORASA, THE ENTRANCE TO THE VINAYA: VINAYAMUKHA
(1969).
137. One is the Wini Pyatton of the Thilon sayadaw, written around 1850 and published in 2 [FIRST]
MAUNGDAUNG SAYADAW ET AL., VINAYA PAKINNAKA VINICCHAYA KYAN 547 (1901). Although Burmese
publishing conventions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did not provide for identifying
the compiler or editor of a collection of religious texts, this book is known to have been compiled by Says
Pye, the greatest Burmese Pali scholar of the turn of the century.
Learned Burmese monks are referred to by the formula "X sayadaw," which identifies their home
village. It means the abbot (literally the "royal teacher") who came from village X.
138. 1 U GAUNG, A DIGEST OF THE BURMESE BUDDHIST LAW CONCERNING INHERITANCE AND
MARRIAGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF TEXTS FROM THImRY-SIx DHAMMATHATS: INHERITANCE (Rangoon,
Burma, Superintendent, Gov't Printing 1898); 2 U GAUNG, A DIGEST OF THE BURMESE BUDDHIST LAW
CONCERNING INHERITANCE AND MARRIAGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF TEXTS FROM THIRTY-SIX
DHAMMATHATS: MARRIAGE (Rangoon, Burma, Superintendent, Gov't Printing 1899).
139. 2 [FIRST] MAUNGDAUNG SAYADAW Er AL., supra note 137; 1 VINAYA SAMUHA VINICCHAYA
KYAN (Mandalay, Burma, Mandalay Taing Thatin Sa Bon Hneit Thike 1899); 2 VINAYA SAMUHA
VINICCHAYA KYAN (1901); 3 VINAYA SAMUHA VINICCHAYA KYAN (1902). The editor of the first volume
of inaya Samuha Vinicchaya Kyan was U Nirodha. See L.D. BARNETT, A CATALOGUE OF THE BURMESE
BOOKS IN THE BRITISH MUSEUM 245 (1913). U Nirodha is also believed to have edited the second and
third volumes.
140. See EDWIN ARNOLD, THE LIGHT OF ASIA (Routledge & Keegan Paul Ltd. 1964) (1880); see also
PHILIP C. ALMOND, THE BRITISH DISCOVERY OF BUDDHISM 1 (1988) (discussing surge in awareness of
Buddhism in late Victorian England resulting from The Light of Asia).
141. See Erik Zfircher, 'Beyond the Jade Gate': Buddhism in China, Vietnam and Korea, in GOMBRICH
ET AL., supra note 100, at 193, 197.
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century. 42 Only when the pilgrim monks 4 3 returned to China with Vinaya
texts from different traditions did the Chinese begin to dispute which Vinaya
tradition was best, and not until the seventh century CE did the Dharmagupta
Vinaya prevail.'" The Tibetans, encountering Buddhism later, distinguished
the canonical Vinaya, which became part of the Kangyur, from the Mula-
Sarvastivada commentaries, which were inserted in the Tangyur.'5 Josd
Cabez6n reports that rival Tibetan lineages negotiated which Vinaya works
should be included in their common canon. 46 In the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries, the Tibetans produced at least two subcommentaries on the Vinaya,
and later, in the age of treatises, "each cloister university ha[d] their own
textbooks.' 4 7 Wherever Buddhist monasteries were to be found, there were
also vinayadharas organizing their materials into such legalistic formulations
as:
If a Bhikkhu [monk], with the idea of killing, digs the earth and
makes a pit with the intention that Mr. So and So should fall into it
and die, then at the very first digging and the coming out of the earth
from the pit, he becomes guilty of a Dukkata [slight] offence. If by
falling into the pit, one experiences pain, then he becomes guilty of
a Thullaccaya [gravel offence. If he dies, then one becomes guilty of
a Parajika offence [the most serious category, the punishment for
which was expulsion from the Order]. 4
The Vinaya commentaries developed such technical complexities for procedural
as well as substantive law:
It is possible that any [collegiate monastic decision] might fail ....
if there is a mistake regarding the topic to be dealt with .. . the
announcement .... the subsequent proclamation .... the
boundary .... which has to be determined in order to include the
complete [community of monks], and, finally, regarding the
assembly .... that is of those monks whose presence in person...
142. See ZOjRCHER, supra note 9, at 204, 229-30 (noting that complete Vinaya was translated into
Chinese only under sponsorship of Shih Hui-yuan (334-417 CE)).
143. These monks were Faxian at the end of the fourth. Xuanzang in the early seventh, and Yijmg
in the late seventh century. See SKILTON, supra note 106. at 152. 160. 167-68: Gombnch. supra note 100.
at 78; K.A. Nilakanta Sastri, Chinese Travellers, in 2500 YEARS OF BUDDtSm. supra note 98. at 254:
Zfircher, supra note 141, at 198.
144. See Bangwei Wang, Buddhist Nikayas Through Ancient Chinese Eyes. in BUDDIUST STUDIES
PRESENT AND FUTURE 65, 70-71 (Ananda W.P. Guruge ed.. 1992).
145. See Josd Ignacio Cabez6n, The Canonization of Philosophy and the Rhetoric of Sddhanta in
Tibetan Buddhism, in BUDDHA NATURE 7, 9 nn.5-6 (Paul J. Griffiths & John P. Keenan eds., 1990).
146. See id. at 7-8, 13-14.
147. TSEDROEN, supra note 116, at 82.
148. BAPAT & HIRAKAWA, supra note 128, at 324-25. On the elaboration of the degrees of offenses.
see Charles S. Prebish, Vinaya and Pratimoksa: The Foundation of Buddhist Ethics. in STUDIES IN HISTORY
OF BUDDHISM 223, 224, 233 (A.K. Narain ed., 1980).
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or whose consent ... is required, if they are absent because of an
urgent reason. 149
Did this Vinaya legal culture inform the law that applied to the laity? With
regard to Tibet, French has no doubts:
The Vinaya, with its elaborations of the important factors in decision-
making, the credibility of evidence, the faults of bad intentions, the
appropriate circumstances under which to bring up a legal case, the
correct speaking style of an accuser, and comprehensively delineated
offenses with corresponding penalties, stood as the backdrop for the
entire secular legal system."
The position in Southeast Asia is equally clear.15 1 The Vinaya has played the
same classical law role as Romano-Canonical Law in Europe.152 China is a
more difficult case. The inaya did not shape Chinese law from the beginning,
as it did in Central and Southeast Asia, but claims have been made for a more
marginal influence. Three spheres have been suggested: that the Vinaya's
emphasis on intention sharpened the Chinese distinction between mens rea and
negligence; that it served as a model for the Tang Dynasty's modifications to
the legal and bureaucratic system; and that the lu-shi, the Chinese
vinayadharas, were the first Chinese legal specialists.
t53
The Vnaya could be a real influence on local law without being an
important influence. As Alan Watson has demonstrated, legal transplants can
be trivial, almost meaningless events. Watson portrays the typical author of
law texts as a bricoleur, a cut-and-paste artist making serviceable verbiage
from the scraps, translations, and subclauses that weigh down his shelves and
clog his hard drive."5 A moment's reflection on how we draft our own legal
149. 0. VON HINOBER, Buddhist Law and the Phonetics of Pali, in VON HINOBER, supra note 104, at
198, 201 (quoting Vinaya) (citation omitted). Ellipses indicate omission of the Pall terms whose translations
are provided.
150. FRENCH, supra note 1, at 79. She reports a fascinating claim by a former administrative assistant
that the codes for the laity are more Catholic than the Pope. The Vinaya spells out punishments in a
legalistic way, but the codes restrict themselves to giving a method by which each situation can be
investigated. See id. at 317-18.
151. For the influence of Buddhism on northern Thai legal texts from the fourteenth century on, see
Aroonrut Wichienkeeo, Lanna Customary Law, in THAI LAW: BUDDHIST LAW-ESSAYS ON THE LEGAL
HISTORY OF THAILAND, LAOS AND BURMA 31, 34-37 (Andrew Huxley ed., 1996). For examples of
Buddhist legal provisions and illustrative stories that occur widely throughout Southeast Asian legal
literature, see Andrew Huxley, Introduction to THAI LAW: BUDDHIST LAW-ESSAYS ON THE LEGAL
HISTORY OF THAILAND, LAOS AND BURMA, supra, at 1, 19.
152. Happily, the Vinaya lacks the Roman fixation on power and ownership-imperium and dominiun.
153. See Luke T. Lee & Whalen W. Lai, The Chinese Conceptions of Law: Confucian, Legalist, and
Buddhist, 29 HASTINGS LJ. 1307, 1314 (1978). This is the only published consideration of the issue of
which I am aware.
154. See ALAN WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF LAW 73-76 (1985) (arguing that legal institutions can
be borrowed, in whole or in part, even by societies lacking donor's social institutions corresponding to
borrowed legal institutions, and that Roman law was thus widely borrowed into customary law systems);
ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 95-101 (1974) (arguing that
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documents adds a disturbing plausibility to his picture. Perhaps, then, when
Tibetan and Southeast Asian authors began to write law, the Vinava was
simply the nearest text to hand. French claims, however, that Buddhism
influenced Tibetan law at a deeper level. Tibetan law was *thoroughly
Buddhist""' in that its unspoken assumptions, "the elements of the cultural
backdrop,"' 156 derived from Buddhism.' 57
D. Buddhist Anarchism and Antinomianism
Two themes hidden deep within Buddhist legal culture are relevant to law
and state. Perhaps they are better described as areas of tension, where the
earliest Buddhist scriptures endorse rival positions. The first pits anarchism
against kingship; the second pits antinomianism against law. The first tension
inheres in the political structure that the Vinaya lays down. This structure
combines strong local organization with anarchy at all higher levels. The
Vinaya sets up detailed procedures for organizing monks within a parish
boundary, but tells us nothing about how the parishes are to interact.'5 ' A
Tibetan text lists five stances, from least to most favorable, that your parish
can take towards another: You can regard them as immodest monks who only
loosely observe the Vinaya; deaf-mute monks who do not know the scriptures;
democratic monks who want to decide everything by vote; good monks who
desire the general public's earthly welfare; or good monks who seek
supramundane welfare.5 9 At the local level, monks have both government
and sanctions. The Vinaya mentions several examples of good monks forcibly
ejecting bad monks,'60 but these acts of violence, which depend on the ad
hoc mobilization of popular anger and disapproval, are quite different from
state sanctions. Lacking the state's ability to employ executioners and prison
wardens, the monkhood, like the mob, must make do with public shaming
legal borrowings are common, productive, easy, transformative, and independent of borrower's accurate
understanding of what is borrowed).
155. FRENCH, supra note 1, at 343.
156. Id. at 59.
157. I believe that the same is true of Burmese law. See Andrew Huxley. Buddhism and Law-The
View from Mandalay, 18 J. INT'L ASs'N BUDDHIST STUD. 47 (1995) (arguing that Vnava deeply influenced
Burmese law for laity).
158. The position of "king of the monks" (sangharaja) has been invented from time to time in pans
of Southeast Asia, but it has no canonical justification. See Heinz Bechert. Aspects of Therarada Buddhism
in Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia, in THE BUDDHIST HERITAGE. supra note 103. at 19. 24. 26 (noting
instance of rebellion against Sri Lankan king in 1760 "with the knowledge of the sangharaja." although
"[i]n principle, the Buddhist sangha [monastic order] has no head"): Heinz Bechert. 'To Be a Burmese Is
to Be a Buddhist': Buddhism in Burma, in GOMIBRICH ET AL.. supra note 100. at 147. 153 (noting existence
of Burmese post of sangharaja from eighteenth to early twentieth century and its lack of basis in Vinaya).
159. See ANUKUL CHANDRA BANERJEF SARVASTIVADA LITERATURE 232 (1957) (citng Tibctan
Posadhasthapanavastu). The list is also found in the Gilgit manuscripts. See 3 Git.GrT ,IANUSCRItrS pt.
3, at xvii (Nalinaksha Dut ed., 1943). These manuscripts were discovered in Kashmir in 1931 and arc
ascribed to the fifth or sixth century CE. See I GILGrr MANUSCRIPTS at i-ti (Nalinaksha Dutt ed., 1939)
160. See Huxley, supra note 122. at 151.
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rituals ("charivari") and forced social isolation of an offender ("sending to
Coventry"), both of which are mentioned in the Vinaya. 16' The Vinaya does
not tolerate organized violence, for a permanent machinery of repression would
be bad karma for those who manned it.
Precisely the same attitudes apply to the state. There is a mainstream
tradition of political philosophy in the Pali scriptures that justifies kingship as
an answer to the question, "Who should punish thieves?"' 62 This has usually
(though in my view mistakenly) been labeled "Buddhist social contract
theory."' 163 Yet there is also an anarchist countercurrent that condemns all
state violence, however justified the punishment and however merciful the
sentence. The countercurrent is most obviously visible in the Mugha-Pakkha
Jataka,164 in which the Buddha, born as the prince Temiya, uses subterfuge
to escape the succession. If he reigns, he must punish, and if he punishes, he
will incur enough bad karma to send him to hell.'65 This countercurrent still
runs as strong as ever. French notices it in Tibet after four centuries of so-
called theocracy. Surely a state personified by the Dalai Lama could make
moral claims for itself? Apparently not: "A judge took on the karmic results
of his actions as a judge, regardless of the cloak of governmental office. There
were no fictitious legal entities in Tibet, no corporate veils screening
individuals from legal and karmic liability."' 166 Karma does not recognize the
fiction of the state, but operates at a presocial, indeed prehuman, level where
every living thing takes responsibility for its own acts. Burmese intellectuals
expressed the same attitude in the 1840s during the preparation of the first
English translation of a Burmese law text. The text itself drew a distinction
between justified and unjustified state violence, mentioning "the judge who,
161. See id.
162. For the most persuasive statements of the mainstream tradition, see Balkrishna G. Gokhale, Early
Buddhist Kingship, 26 J. ASIAN STUD. 15, 15 (1966), who argues that the Buddha favored tribal republics
and feared monarchy, but saw the latter as inevitable and necessary to prevent anarchy and sought to
temper royal absolutism with morality, and Stanley J. Tambiab, King Mahasammata: The First King in the
Buddhist Story of Creation, and His Persisting Relevance, 20 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL SOC'Y OXFORD 101,
102 (1989), who argues for a social contractarian reading of the Agganna Sutta as an account of the
necessary election of an ideal ruler to embody and enforce virtue amidst the karmic degeneration of
mankind. Other recent accounts have identified elements of sly subversion within the mainstream. See
Steven Collins, The Discourse on What Is Primary (Agganna-Sutta): An Annotated Translation, 21 J.
INDIAN PHIL. 301, 317 (1993) (arguing that Agganna Sutta satirizes caste society and monarchy as
departures from community values of Vinaya); Richard Gombrich, The Buddha's Book of Genesis?, 35
INDO-IRANIAN J. 159, 161-63 (1992) (arguing that Agganna Sutta's account of divinely ordained social
structure and kingship is satirical). On the way the mainstream tradition was understood in recent centuries,
see Steven Collins & Andrew Huxley, The Post-Canonical Adventures of Mahasammata, 24 J. INDIAN
PHIL. 623, 635-37 (1996); we argue that in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Burma, coronation oaths
whose promises ofjust rule were believed to be enforced by supernatural curses on unjust rulers, and which
some scholars interpret in social contract terms, were instead more cosmological than legal or constitutional.
163. See Andrew Huxley, The Buddha and the Social Contract, 24 J. INDIAN PHIL. 407, 418 (1996).
164. 6 THE JATAKA OR STORIES OF THE BUDDHA'S FORMER BIRTHS I (E.B. Cowell ed., E.B. Cowell
& W.H.D. Rouse trans., 1907) [hereinafter JATAKA].
165. See id. at 11.
166. FRENCH, supra note 1, at 161.
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abiding by the Damathat [law text for the laity], gives his decisions so as to
avoid incurring the pains of hell."' 67 The English translator added a footnote,
which undoubtedly reflected the views of his Burmese advisers: "Decisions in
strict accordance with the Damathat cannot be given without entailing sin on
the judge, punishments being ordered in it involving death, mutilation, and
pains which cannot be inflicted without sin, according to the Burman
religion." 168 I have not yet found a Chinese statement of this theme. At least
we have contemporary evidence that conversion to Buddhism had implications
for law and state. In the third century CE, the Chinese governor of the city that
stood near present-day Hanoi
"abandoned the norms and teachings of the former Sages and
abolished the laws and statutes of the Han, and he used to wear a
purple turban, to play the lute and to burn incense, and to read
heterodox and vulgar religious scriptures... ; this, he said,
contributed to the transforming influence (of his goverment).'
69
This Buddhist anarchism derives from the higher principle of nonviolence.
The king is the prime target of this doctrine, because violence lies at the heart
of his job. Ordinary villagers will from time to time be faced with the problem
of justified violence, and Buddhist literature therefore warns them not to kill
a dangerous mad bull' 70 or use violence against a serpent that is crushing
them within its coils. 7 ' I expect that one or two Buddhists over the course
of history have failed to adhere to this exacting standard, but it is
recommended as best practice, the counsel of perfection to which king and
villager alike should aspire. Buddhism regards karma (the Buddhist theory of
action and reaction) as conceptually prior to dharma (the duties that Buddhas
preach).72 Dharma is contingent: It becomes unknowable when there has
been no Buddha to preach it within living memory.' 73 Karma is basic: Our
universe is constructed in such a way that violence, however justified, gets its
desert. This assumption plays a role parallel to Sir Isaac Newton's observation
167. D. RICHARDSON, THE DAMATHAT, OR THE LAWS OF ME.oo. TRANSLATED FROM1 THE BURI..SE
154 (Maulmain, Burma, American Baptist Mission Press 1847).
168. Id. at 154 n.-.
169. ZORCHER, supra note 9. at 51 (quoting Chinese work San-kuo chilh) (footnote omitted).
170. See Ch. Duroiselle, Notes sur la Giographie Apocryphe de la Birmante 6 Propos de la Ugende
de Puma, 5 BULLEnN DE L'P-COLE FRANCAISE D'EXTRItE-ORIE.N'T 146. 148-49 (1905) (recounting legend
of villagers who killed and ate mad bull, after which they were reborn as animals to be killed by bull
reincarnated as hunter) (citing Burmese work Shwe Zetdaw Thamaumg. probably written in eighteenth
century).
171. See R. SPENCE HARDY, A MANUAL OF BUDDHISM. IN ITS MODERN DEVELOP. IENT; TRANSLATED
FROM SINGHALESE Mss. 480 (London, Williams & Norgate. 2d ed. 1880) (ciung thirtecnth-century
Sinhalese work Pujawaliya by Mayurapada).
172. See FRENCH, supra note 1, at 36 (explaining Buddhist doctrine as means of understanding and
escaping suffering and cycle of rebirths caused by karma); see also id. at 70 (defining dharma as -Buddlust
doctrine and practice").
173. See von Hiniber, supra note I11. at 7.
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that every action has an equal and opposite reaction. Kings must cope with
karma when punishing criminals, just as they have to cope with Newton's
Third Law of Dynamics when playing pool or firing a rifle.
The second area of tension is between the mainstream Buddhist attachment
to rules and the crosscurrent of antinomianism. I must define what I mean by
this last word. Strong antinomianism ("The more rules you break, the closer
you are to redemption.") was a latecomer to Buddhism. It is only found in
some Tantric practices.174 Weak antinomianism, in which "love prevails over
law" and the impulsive behavior of the truly virtuous is better than a
calculating obedience to rules, has been part of Buddhism from the start.
75
The Vinaya contains its own critique of the notion of rule. The monk Sona told
the Buddha that his enlightenment had taught him to value nonviolence based
on "the essence" over nonviolence due to "the contagion of habit and
custom."' 76 In other words, the Vinaya is a necessary evil: Monks must obey
its rules until they are enlightened enough to do the right thing
instinctively. 77 Not only are there accomplished individuals who are beyond
law, but there are periods in human history when law is unnecessary. When
the monk Bhaddali asked the Buddha why an increase in Vinaya rules had
coincided with a decrease in the number of monks achieving profound
knowledge, the Buddha replied that the preponderance of rules and the scarcity
of enlightened monks were both symptoms of the general deterioration in true
dharma and in life itself. 78 In his discussions of kingship, the Buddha made
the same point about state law: It is a product of troubled times and should be
tolerated rather than admired. 179 Kingship, taxation, crime, and punishment
follow our expulsion from the prejuristic Eden.
In Pai Buddhism, the arguments for and against the rule have stabilized
into a general recognition that the justice of the situation prevails. Rules
merely give a first approximation to the truth, but Theravada literature loves
to demonstrate the complexity of life by evoking the exceptions to rules and
the occasions when following good advice has unintended consequences. This
174. See Anagarika Govinda, Principles of Tantric Buddhism, in 2500 YEARS OF BUDDHISM, supra
note 98, at 357, 358 (noting that in Tantric work Guhyasamaja, "murder, falsehood, theft and intercourse
with women are recommended"). Although Tantra is iconoclastic towards social conventions, see PHILIP
RAWSON, THE ART OF TANTRA 24 (1973), it prescribes its own rigid rules for the performance of
meditation, sexual rituals, and other spiritual practices, see id. at 14-16.
175. See SKILTON, supra note 106, at 77-79.
176. 4 THE BOOK OF THE DISCIPLINE (VINAYA PrrAKA): (MAHAVAGGA) 243 (I.B. Homer trans.,
1951).
177. Compare Marcus Tullius Cicero's story of Xenocrates, who, when asked what his pupils gained
from his instruction, "is said to have replied: 'To do of their own accord what they are compelled to do
by the law."' CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA, in DE RE PUBLICA [ET] DE LEGIBUS, at I, 17 (Clinton Walker
Keyes trans., 1928).
178. See 2 THE COLLECTON OF THE MIDDLE LENGTH SAYINGS (MAJJHIMA-NKAYA) 115-16 (I.B.
Homer trans., 1957).
179. See Huxley, supra note 122, at 150.
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theme occurs in one of the suttas"'8 most quoted in Pali Buddhist political
circles. Steven Collins summarizes it as follows:
With poverty thus widespread, one of [the king's] subjects takes
something deliberately from another; he is brought before the king,
who asks if it is true that he stole something; the man replies that it
is. When the king asks why, the thief replies that he cannot live
otherwise. The king then gives him money and urges him to use it to
support himself and his family, to start up a business and to give as
alms to ascetics and brahmins in order to go to heaven. This is all, of
course, good Buddhist advice for the laity: the king, one might say,
is doing his best at this point. The same sequence of events happens
again with another person; and... people start to conclude-with
perfect farcical logic-that the way to get money is to steal and have
the king find out.1 8'
That summa ius can mean sunmna iniuria is a favorite Buddhist rhetorical ploy.
It implies that the rule is a useful didactic device, but true wisdom comes from
recognizing when among the infinite variety of situations the rule should be
abandoned. French finds this hostility to rules in Tibet in even stronger form:
"In short, in most situations, parties, judges, and conciliators engaged in
factoring, viewed each case as unique, did not cite previous legal situations as
precedents, and therefore did not elaborate precedential chains of legal rules
based on cases."'
82
Buddhist lawyers derive their preference for situations over rules from a
more basic principle: the nature of causation. In the Pali canon, causation is
analyzed as a process of codependent origination: Of the several causes that
coalesce to bring about an effect, none can be singled out as causa efficiens
or causa sine qua non.'8 3 One cause of Abraham Lincoln's demise was that
John Wilkes Booth pulled the trigger. Another, and equally a cause, was the
President's decision to go to the theater that night. All these codependent
causes are what French terms "factors" through which a given situation is
analyzed.'8 4 The Buddha's theory of causation is not a philosophical footnote
to his central message; it is his central message.'85 Buddhist causation is his
General Theory of Relativity applying to all events in the world, while karma
180. See supra note 112.
181. Collins, supra note 109, at 431 (footnotes omitted). In the 1'aggha Jataka. the trope is applied
in an ecological context. See Vyaggha-Jataka, in 2 1ATAKA. supra note 164. at 244. 244-46 (recounting
fable in which tiger and lion, although vicious animals, are necessary to protect forest from woodcutters).
182. FRENCH, supra note 1, at 145.
183. See DAVID J. KALUPAHANA, CAUSALITY: THE CENTRAL PHILOSOPHY OF BUDDHISi 59 (1975).
184. See, e.g., FRENCH, supra note 1, at 317 (discussing diverse factors considered in cnminal casesl.
185. See 1 THE CoLLECrlON OF THE MIDDLE LENGTH SAYINGS (MAJIMA NIKAYA) 236-37 (.B
Homer trans., 1954) ("This was said by the Lord [Buddha]: 'Whoever sees conditioned genests sees
dhamma [Pali for dharma], whoever sees dhamma sees conditioned genesis."') (discourse by Buddha's
disciple Sariputta) (footnote omitted).
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is his Special Theory of Relativity applying only to sentient beings and the
ethics of their actions. Causation has ontological and epistemological
implications. It is, says Bruce Reichenbach, "a primitive or basic relational
concept, not further analysable into anything more fundamental."',86 In short,
if we are looking for the backdrop to Buddhism, causation is as far upstage as
we can get.
E. The Nondualistic Cosmology of Tibetan Buddhism
It is as little use looking for the Buddhist approach to law as it is the
Chinese or the European. On the vexed question of law and the state,
Buddhism provides arguments to both sides of the debate. The Pali canon, the
earliest stratum of Buddhist literature, provides two examples. The
countercurrent to Buddhist political thinking is Anarcho-Buddhism, which
derives from karma as a basic ethical condition of the universe. The
countercurrent to Buddhist law is Buddhist antinomianism, which derives from
the general theory of causation. Causation and karma describe the world; the
Vinaya and the law texts that draw on it prescribe for the world. Europeans,
noticing the conceptual subservience of prescription to description, will think
of their own natural law tradition. I shall return to this comparison in Part V.
French does not explicitly consider natural law, but her answer can be inferred.
Because natural law is intensely dualistic, 87 it can only usefully be compared
with the concepts of another dualistic culture: "In Tibet, rational thought with
its linear, dualistic, agential foundation is not primary .... Tibetans simply
had a different symbolic starting point, an initial view of the world as All-
One."'
188
Tibetan thought's symbolic starting point, its ultimate cosmological
symbol, is the mandala.'8 9 French struggles to express the full significance
of the mandala: "In their notion of the One, each level or unit of the whole
both actually is and also reflects the All."' 90 But who can describe a genre
of the graphic arts in words alone? This is especially difficult when the
Tibetans view the mandala as a mode of transport, an object to be meditated
on, rather than a work of art.'' French's governing image of Tibetan culture
186. BRUCE R. REICHENBACH, THE LAW OF KARMA: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 92 (1990).
187. The "natural" is privileged over the "artificial," "nature" over "human culture," and "law" over
"contingency."
188. FRENCH, supra note 1, at 177.
189. See RAWSON, supra note 174, at 174-82; GIUSEPPE TucCt, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF TIlE
MANDALA (Alan Houghton Brodrick trans., Rider & Co. 1961) (1949); HEINRICHt ZIMMER, MYTHS AND
SYMBOLS IN INDIAN ART AND CIVILIZATION 144-46 (Bollingen Series No. 6, Joseph Campbell ed., 1946).
190. FRENCH, supra note 1, at 175.
191. See Janet Gyatso, Image as Presence: The Place of Art in 7Tibetan Religious Thinking, in 3
REYNOLDS ET AL., supra note 96, at 30 (describing Tibetan Buddhist conception of images as symbolic
representations of ultimate truths, as icons of members of pantheon, and as stimuli for visualization
meditation); cf. ZIMMER, supra note 189, at 142-43 (describing use of images in visualizing Absolute).
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is not for mental virgins: Unless you have contemplated an image and let your
mind wander, you will not understand why she emphasizes the mandala's
qualities of dynamism and immanence. If anyone is game to try such free-
association (or the more disciplined techniques of meditation), I recommend
starting with a brilliantly designed double-page spread of graphics in The
Golden Yoke.' 92 Tibetan Buddhism taught the faithful how they could,
meditating on images such as these, visualize the entire universe and all the
futures and pasts that the universe will endure.1
93
]1. HAN CHINA
A. Ancient Chinese Legal Thought: The Context of the Boshu
Law and Morality in Ancient China, like The Golden Yoke, is at risk of
being overlooked by those who would most benefit from reading it. The story
behind Peerenboom's book starts on April 4, 168 BCE, with the burial of a
prince at Mawangdui in Hunan province. 9 Buried with him were wooden
statues, meals packed in bamboo containers with lacquerware on which to eat
them, silk paintings to contemplate, and silk manuscripts as a bedside
library.'95 Silk proved to be as durable as it was luxurious: When
archaeologists excavated the tomb in 1973, most of the manuscripts were still
legible. They are as significant a find as the Dead Sea Scrolls' 96 or the Nag
Hammadi papyri,197 opening another silk route to ancient China. They
include two editions of the Daoist classic Lao Zi,' 9' some short essays on
what I shall call proto-science (the Yin Yang Five Phases school),199 and,
amounting to ten percent of the whole, the Huang-Lao Boshu, which is
Peerenboom's subject matter.20° The Boshu consists of one work in four
192. See FRENCH, supra note I, at 178-79 (depicting various mandalas). The graphics were concei',ed
and designed by Peetie Van Etten and produced by Linda Nishio. See id. at xiv-xv.
193. See Tucct, supra note 189, at 23 ("[A mandala] is. above all, a map of the cosmos. It is the
whole universe in its essential plan, in its process of emanation and of reabsorption.-): Gyatso. supra note
191, at 30-31 (describing use of sacred images to assist visualization of mundane world as Pure Land realm
of Buddha).
194. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 2, at 286 n.ll.
195. See id. at 1.
196. THE DEAD SEA SCROLLS IN ENGLISH (Geza Vermes trans.. 4th ed. 1995)-
197. THE NAG HAMMADI LIBRARY IN ENGLISH (James M. Robinson ed., Members of Coptic Gnostic
Library Project of Inst. for Antiquity & Christianity trans., 3d ed. 1988).
198. TAO TE CHING (D.C. Lau trans., 1963). The author of this work. by whose name it is sometimes
known, was Lao Zi.
199. Yin and yang are words of uncertain original meaning that became important philosophical terms
in ancient Chinese "correlative cosmology." PEERE.'BOO.1, supra note 2. at 226. "'The constant cause of
heaven is that forces in opposition to each other cannot both anse simultaneously. . . The yin and yang
are these mutually opposite forces. Therefore when one expands outward, the other retracts inward. "'
Id. (quoting Dong Zhongshu). On the particular school known as Yin Yang Five Phases, see id. at 225-29,
and infra notes 235-41 and accompanying text.
200. See PEERE.NBOOM, supra note 2, at 1. 6.
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sections (or perhaps four separate works) discussing questions such as "How
are we to live as individuals and as a society?" and "Is law a help or a
hindrance in achieving sociopolitical order?" The four sections (or works) are
Canonical Laws, Sixteen Classics, Weighing by the Scales, and Origins of the
Way.201 If they have a collective title, we do not know it.202 Nor can we
do anything but guess at the identity of the author(s) and the date and place of
composition.2 3 The only certainty about the text is that it was written from
within the particular Chinese intellectual tradition known as Huang-Lao.
The Huang-Lao scholars, like the Qumran sect and the Christian Gnostics,
had been known only from occasional references and citations in the official
chronicles and bibliographies. From these it appears that Huang-Lao thought
was most influential in court circles between 206 and 140 BCE.'04 Why
should we be interested in such a short-lived ideology? The seventy-year reign
of Marxism-Leninism demands our attention because we have just lived
through it. The sixty-year reign of Huang-Lao thought demands our attention
because it was crucial to the development of China's legal and political
traditions. The Warring States, having contended from the fifth to the third
century BCE, were at last unified under the Qin emperor (221-206 BCE) and
his Legalist advisers. The Legalist fervor for law, centrally promulgated and
universally applied, made government on an imperial scale possible, but in the
matter of executing intellectual opponents and burning rival books, the
Legalists' overenthusiasm has been criticized. 5 Karen Turner calls the fall
of the Qin empire "one of the most influential failures in Chinese history"
because it discredited Legalism by association. 2° Would the Qin ideal of a
Greater China, like Alexander the Great's ideal of a Greater Macedon, last no
more than one man's lifetime? One way or another, it endured. The founders
of the Han Dynasty managed to establish stable institutions by means of which
Greater China could survive and expand. From about 100 BCE, these
institutions were based on Dong Zhongshu's mixture of revived Confucianism
and naturalistic proto-science.0 7 Before 100 BCE, Confucian ideas could not
have served the Han empire, because they were still wedded to the feudal,
warlord society that the empire was trying to abolish. Until 1973, all we knew
201. See id at 6.
202. See id at 7-9.
203. See id. at 9-12.
204. See id at 218; see also Michael Loewe, Huang Lao Thought and the Huainanzi, 4 J. ROYAL
ASIATIC Soc'Y (3d s.) 377, 383-85 (1994).
205. The Chih-fu inscription of 218 BCE gives a glimpse of the Qin (Ch'in) Emperor's stance in such
matters: "'The powerful and overbearing he boiled and exterminated; The ordinary folk he lifted and
saved."' Derk Bodde, The State and Empire of Ch'in, in I THE CAMBRiIXE HISTORY OF CHINA: THE CH'IN
AND HAN EMPIRES 20, 76 (Denis Twitchett & Michael Loewe eds., 1986) (quoting 2 LES M9MIRES
HISTORIQUES DE SE-,,A TS'IEN 158 (_douard Chavannes trans., Adrien Maisonneuve 1969) (1897)).
206. Karen Turner, Sage Kings and Laws in the Chinese and Greek Traditions, in HERITAGE OF CHINA
86, 88 (Paul S. Ropp ed., 1990).
207. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 2, at 255.
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about Huang-Lao thinking was that it had to fit this context. It had to have
differed enough from Legalism to be respectable after the fall of Qin, but have
shared enough with Legalism to afford practical support to the early Han
emperors.
B. The Huang-Lao Boshu as Natural Law
Peerenboom has undertaken to explain Huang-Lao thought so that it fits
the desired context. In a close reading of the silk manuscripts, he presents
Huang-Lao as a natural law theory2°S such as Marcus Tullius Cicero2°9 or
Saint Thomas Aquinas 210 could have understood fairly easily. Peerenboom
then contrasts the silk manuscripts with Confucian, Legalist, and Daoist
texts.21 Whereas the Boshu "represents an aberration within the Chinese
intellectual tradition and may be of considerable interest for that reason alone,
it is in its broad contours all too common within the Western."2- 12 He
concludes by extrapolating from texts to people in a speculative intellectual
history of the rise and fall of Huang-Lao: who wrote what, who learned from
whom, and who was in which emperor's favor.213 Peerenboom is
unsympathetic to Huang-Lao's message from the grave: "How unfortunate to
lie buried and neglected for 2000 years only to be unearthed in the era of
postmodernism, perhaps in the history of Western philosophy the intellectual
milieu least hospitable to epistemological foundationalisms, correspondence
theories of truth, natural law doctrines, and the like."2' 4 Rather than
promoting the Boshu itself, Law and Morality in Ancient China promotes an
entirely new story about the development of classical Chinese law and ethics,
which (because the philosophers advised the emperor) is also a new story
about the development of Chinese law. The old story proceeded from the
opposition between Legalists and Confucians.2 5 The Legalists preached a
kind of Hobbesian positivism: Humanity was selfish and had to be frightened
into restrained behavior by law (fa) and punishment." 16 The Confucians, as
their opponents, must therefore have been natural lawyers in some sense. 17
Their rites (li) must have been based on the natural order of the world. 2Is
208. See id. at 27-102.
209. See HUNTINGTON CAIRNS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHY FROM PLATO To HEGEL 127-62 (1949).
210. See id. at 163-204.
211. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 2, at 103-215.
212. Id. at 265.
213. See id. at 217-61.
214. Id. at 265.
215. See 1 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KMTZ. INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 361-65 (Tony
Weir trans., Clarendon Press, 2d rev. ed. 1987) (1977).
216. See 1 JOSEPH NEEDHAM, THE SHORTER SCIENCE AND CIVIuSATION IN CHINA 274 (abndged by
Colin A. Ronan, 1978).
217. See I ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 215, at 361.
218. See id. at 362.
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The new story starts with the recognition that classical Chinese philosophy
had more than two schools. Peerenboom describes at least five leading players:
In addition to Confucianists and Legalists, there are Daoists, proto-scientists,
and the Huang-Lao themselves. If our starting point is Confucius's
Analects,219 the subsequent schools can be described as incorporating or
reacting against elements of what went before. Peerenboom's particular talent
is for defining the issues that differentiated these increasingly eclectic schools.
His central contention is that the Huang-Lao, who borrowed from all four of
the other schools, mixed a brew that was quite unique in Chinese intellectual
history. Jurisprudentially, the author of the Boshu was a natural lawyer.Y0
Linguistically, he avowed a realist theory that names and forms correspond to
the dao.?" Sociopolitically, he viewed social class as naturally given.222
Peerenboom explains: "These aspects of Huang-Lao philosophy are predicated
on a foundational, correspondence epistemology in which one discovers dao,
the objective natural order, articulated in terms of 1i (principles),fa (laws) and
xing ming (forms and names), by eliminating subjective bias through the
attainment of emptiness and tranquility (xu jing).' '2 3 If the Huang-Lao were
natural lawyers, this fortuitously provides us with a mid-Pacific stepping stone,
an easy access point by which we can enter the Chinese debate on law and
government. Peerenboom regards the provision of access to an otherwise
unfamiliar tradition as an important part of his job.224 Given that the story
of Chinese philosophy starts with the Analects, what kind of hermeneutical
framework does he offer to help us understand Confucius?
The answer, surprisingly, is Rorty: "Rorty's antifoundationalism entails the
rejection of all forms of transcendence, be they correspondence theories of
knowledge, semantic theories of truth, ethical systems ... or natural law
theories. .. ."' Steeping ourselves in Neo-Pragmatism is the best
preparation for Confucius's thought, which "is best characterized in terms of
219. CONFUCIUS, THE ANALECTS (LtIN YU) (D.C. Lau trans., 1979).
220. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 2, at 4.
221. See id. at 40-41. Dao or "Way" is one of the most important terms in Chinese thought (not only
in Daoism) and can mean (in a natural law context) the "normatively correct Way" or "cosmic natural
order." Id. at 32.
222. See id. at 217.
223. Id.
224. See id. at 25-26 (noting that goal of Law and Morality in Ancient China is to understand Chinese
text in preparation for comparison with Western philosophy and for effort to use Chinese ideas to advance
Western philosophy). In a different context, he notes the existence of "at least one school within the
Western tradition that does philosophy in a way sufficiently similar to its Chinese counterpart to serve as
a hermeneutical framework." Id. at 58.
225. Id. at 107. Peerenboom fails to mention Lyotard, who, to my mind, reaches similar conclusions.
For example, Lyotard does not expect any "last reconciliation between language games (which, under the
name of faculties, Kant knew to be separated by a chasm)," and argues that "only the transcendental
illusion (that of Hegel) can hope to totalize them into a real unity." LYOTARD, supra note 93, at 81. Lyotard
invokes Ludwig Wittgenstein and Theodor Adomo as initiators of the postmodem reexamination of the
Enlightenment. See id. at 73. Rorty shares an interest in the first-named. See RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY
AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 5-7 (1979).
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pragmatic coherence rather than foundational correspondence, as an aesthetic
rather than a logical order."2' 6 European postmodernity turns out to be the
access point to Chinese premodernity. Fragmenting our notion of the subject
gets us nearer to Chinese ways of thinking, as Graham also argued:
The spontaneity of preferences changing in relative weight with
expanding or contracting awareness is one of the implicit assumptions
a Westerner has to make explicit in interpreting Chinese thinkers,
dislodging his own very questionable preconception that as rational
Ego he somehow detaches himself from his own spontaneity, watches
unmoved even his own emotions, and only afterwards starts
thinking.27
The Confucian gentleman developed his sensitivity to status and situation to
dandified extremes: He knew, without having to formulate a rule, how his
behavior had to match the circumstances, much as a Parisian exquisite, without
ever having codified his fashion sense, knows exactly which cravat or periwig
best suits the occasion. Daoism reacted against this "postmodern" aspect of
Confucianism. Lao Zi rejected the pragmatic epistemology: The Daoist sage
"by engaging in the (meditative) process of emptying, directly intuits the best
way to proceed."2 28 There are foundational truths out there to be learned, but
they can only be apprehended by special techniques of introspection.?
Rather than developing a full anarchist position, Lao Zi adopted an agnostic,
garden-cultivatin 30 attitude to politics. '1 Nonetheless, Lao Zi agreed with
Confucius in rejecting "rule ethics, codified laws, absolute values in favor of
a context-specific solution agreeable to all."232
226. PEERENBOOM, supra note 2, at 104. This stage of Peerenboom's argument draws heavily on
DAVID L. HALL & ROGER T. AMES, THINKING THROUGH CONFUCIUs (1987). Alasdair Maclntyre makes
an interesting comment on this point:
David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames have argued recently that there is the sharpest of contrasts
between the presuppositions of traditional Western metaphysical thinking, informed by
conceptions of rational order, and those of classical Chinese thinking, informed instead by
conceptions of order which they describe as aesthetic. But I do not think that I misrepresent
their intention in formulating matters in this way, if I suggest that what their arguments really
show is that within the Confucian mode of thinking there is no place for the classical Westem
contrast between the rational and the aesthetic as modes of ordenng.
Alasdair Maclntyre, lncommensurabilii); Truth, and the Conversation Benveen Confucians and Artstotehanr
About the Virtues, in CULTURE AND MODERNITY: EAST-WEST PHILOSOPHIC PERSPECTIVES. supra note 15.
at 104, 107.
227. A.C. Graham. A Neglected Pre-Han Philosophical Text: Ho-Kuan-Tzu. 52 BULL ScH. ORIE.,rAL
& AFR. STUD. 497, 512 (1989).
228. PEERENBOOM, supra note 2, at 177.
229. The Buddhist monk would agree with the Daoist sage on this, as on the propositbon that the
struggle for power and prestige at court is not the most important end in life.
230. See VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE. in THE PORTABLE VOLTAIRE 229, 328 (Ben Ray Redman ed. &
Richard Aldington trans., Viking Press 1949) (1759) ("Pangloss sometimes said to Candide: *All esents
are linked up in this best of all possible worlds ....' "Tis well said,' replied Candide, *but we must
cultivate our gardens."').
231. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 2, at 185-91.
232. Id. at 177.
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The Legalists broke with the Confucian-Daoist consensus by promoting the
value of rules and codes. The Qin criminal code marked the irrevocable
introduction of carefully drafted rules into China, as the Vinaya marked the
same change in India. The Huang-Lao adopted this aspect of Legalism, but
diverged on the question of practical politics. The great Legalist Han Fei
espoused "positive law where the ultimate authority is the word of the
sovereign.' ' " Huang-Lao adoption of natural law "can be seen in part as an
attempt to curtail the powers ceded a Legalist ruler. ''23" Huang-Lao's idea of
nature paralleled the Yim Yang Five Phases school.2" Peerenboom
emphasizes that the development of jurisprudence cannot be isolated from the
development of science. He travels the same road as Joseph Needham, though
in the opposite direction. Needham invoked the absence of European natural
law to explain why Chinese natural science, despite early promise, failed to
match the achievements of Chinese technology. 236 Peerenboom invokes the
early Chinese developments in natural science as an important influence on
China's only natural law school. The critical event was that the Tian family
usurped power in the state of Qi in 481 BCE: "Needing to justify their
takeover, they appealed to the symbol of the Yellow Emperor, a mythic
warrior who unified the empire through military conquest. In addition, they
sponsored many intellectuals who gathered together at what has become known
as the Jixia Academy." 237 The proto-scientist Zou Yan, the founder of Yin
Yang Five Phases thought, flourished at the Academy in the early third century
BCE.238 Zou Yan took preexisting schemes of correlative thought (yin yang
and the five phases) and reinvented them as "causal correlative
cosmologies."' 9 This shift from a descriptive classification scheme to "a
theory accounting for the actual mechanism by which things are correlated and
exert influence on each other '240 was made possible by thinking of the
natural order as rule-governed. This proto-scientific notion of rules within
nature enabled the Huang-Lao meditators to discover a predetermined dao
instead of the emergent dao sought by Confucius and the Daoists.241
233. Id. at 140.
234. Id.
235. See id. at 227-29.
236. See A SELECTION FROM THE WRITNGS OF JOSEPH NEEDHAM 157, 238-41, 337-43 (Mansel
Davies ed., 1990); 1 NEEDHAM, supra note 216, at 276-306. Compare DERK BODDE, CHINESE THOUGHT,
SOCIETY AND SCIENCE 356-59 (1991) (arguing that aspects of Chinese language, concepts of time,
organismic thinking, and ideas of government, as well as lack of idea of law of nature, hindered Chinese
science), with A.C. GRAHAM, China, Europe, and the Origins of Modern Science: Needham's The Grand
Titration, in UNREASON WITHtN REASON 137 (1992) (arguing that rise of modem European science was
unique historical event, not result of fundamental differences between European and Chinese civilizations,
so that question why China did not develop modem science independently is misguided).
237. PEERENBOOM, supra note 2, at 225.
238. See id. at 226.
239. Id. at 228.
240. Id.
241. See id. at 172.
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Huang-Lao is the only school of Chinese thought whose name reflects its
eclecticism. "Huang" refers to Huang Di, the Yellow Emperor, and signifies
a debt both to the Jixia Academy and to Confucius.2 2 "Lao" refers to Lao
Zi and the importance of emptying meditation in revealing deep truths about
the world. 243 This dual heritage enabled the Huang-Lao to cope with imperial
China's legitimation crisis: "With the inevitable collapse of the despotic Qin
regime, the state stood in dire need of a more people oriented ideology, one
capable of rebuilding the devastated economy, restoring the debilitated political
structures, and regaining the lost support of the masses. Huang-Lao was just
-,,244
such an ideology. In practice, natural law meant the minimum necessary
law. In his press release after overthrowing the Qin, the first Han emperor
said:
Fathers and Elders, you have suffered long enough from the cruel
laws of the [Qin] .... I am merely going to agree with you, Fathers
and Elders, upon [a code of] laws in three articles: he who kills
anyone will be put to death, he who wounds anyone or robs [will be
punished] according to his offence; as to the remainder, I am
repealing and doing away with the laws of the [Qin]. '5
For the next sixty years, the Han Dynasty's policies were Huang-Lao policies.
The Legalist idea that state law was necessary, and that it should consist of
rules, survived the collapse of Qin and has been part of the Chinese synthesis
ever since. Why then were the Huang-Lao chased out of their positions of
influence by the Emperor Wu and Dong Zhongshu? Peerenboom suggests
several possible reasons why Dong Zhongshu's mixture of Confucius and
proto-science should win favor at court.246 For my part, I am happy to
attribute it to fashion: Huang-Lao had ceased to be le dernier cri. What
requires explanation is why Dong Zhongshu's fresh mixture of old elements,
his "Neo-Confucianism," should become firmly established as the summation
of classical Chinese wisdom. His role in mediating classical philosophy to later
millenia can be compared with Justinian's role in mediating classical European
law. Peerenboom gives the answer: "When Emperor Wu, following Dong
Zhongshu's advice, established the Imperial University and examination system
242. See id at 1; see also id. at 90 ("Mhe Yellow Emperor constiuted the ideal ruler in that he had
the support of the people. This is the aspect in which Huang-Lao thought most clearly reflects the positive
influence of Confucianism.").
243. See id. at I; see also id. at 176-77 (arguing that Lao Zi and Huang-Lao agreed that emptying
meditation was means to harmonize moral claims of dao. but Lao Zi saw dao as emergent. while Huang-
Lao saw it as predetermined).
244. Id at 243.
245. Id. at 244 (quoting I PAN Ku, THE HISTORY OF THE FoL~mER HAN DYNASn' 58 (Homer H_ Dubs
trans., 1938) (alterations in original)).
246. See i. at 251-55.
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with the Confucian classics as core curriculum, the eventual victory of
Confucianism was assured. 247 Michael Walzer's interesting discussion of
whether the examination system fostered a true meritocracy relates to the later
centuries of its operation. 248 The introduction of the system shows us
knowledge and power in their most intimate embrace: Dong Zhongshu was
engaged in a simultaneous exercise in canon formation and in the
professionalization of the intellectuals. Which of the earlier attitudes to law
would prevail in Dong Zhongshu's Neo-Confucianism? Though Confucius had
the hypercanonical status of that-which-is-on-the-examination thrust upon him,
the wisdom of a practicing bureaucrat lay elsewhere: The idea of an imperial
code, its revisions, and its proclamations had become entrenched. Chinese
identity, as defined by the examiners, favored the Confucian preference for
virtue over rule. When Buddhism settled in China a couple of centuries later,
the Neo-Confucians deployed against it an antinomianism that had become
more sophisticated through debate with Huang-Lao and Legalists:
Chinese people and foreigners are naturally different, and this
difference is rooted in their different natures (xing). Chinese people
are endowed with a clear and harmonious nature, and are capable of
humane sentiments and upholding correct morality; therefore Duke of
Zhou and Confucius taught them the teaching of human nature and
learning; foreigners are endowed with a violent nature and are greedy
and full of anger; therefore Sakyamuni [the Buddha] imposed on them
the discipline of the five precepts.249
The emperors may have deigned to give their subjects an imperial code, but
students were taught to conceive of morality as an area to which rules were
quite alien. At the time Buddhism was reaching China, morality was on the
syllabus, while law was what you picked up on the job after you qualified.
This had the effect of distinguishing law and morality more sharply than in
third- and fourth-century Rome: Law (and Buddhism) dealt with rules, while
morality (and the official culture) dealt with situations.
247. Id. at 250.
248. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 139-43 (1983).
249. Tang Yijie, The Development of Chinese Culture: Some Comments in the Light of the Study of
the Introduction of Indian Buddhism into China, in FROM BENARES TO BEIJING: ESSAYS ON BUDDHISM
AND CHINESE RELIGION IN HONOUR OF PROF. JAN YUN-HUA 261, 266 (Koichi Shinohara & Gregory S.
Schopen eds., 199 1) (quoting He Chengtian's Reply to Zong Bin). The Duke of Zhou was a historical figure
admired by Confucius as a model ruler. See D.C. Lau, Introduction to CONFUCIUS, supra note 219, at 9,
17-18, 28. Richard Gombrich provides a terse formulation of the five precepts, the "primary Buddhist
formulation of [the] universal morality": "[D]on't kill, don't steal, don't have wrong sex, don't lie, and
don't drink, because that leads to the other four things." Richard F. Gombrich, The Duty of a Buddhist
According to the Pali Scriptures, in THE CONCEPT OF DUTY IN SOUTH ASIA 107, 108 (Wendy Doniger
O'Flaherty & J. Duncan M. Derrett eds., 1978).
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C. Comparison, Translation, and the Contingency of Metaphor
In Peerenboom's new story, the discovery of the Boshu enables us to
appreciate what happened during a critical period in Chinese jurisprudence.
Without the Huang-Lao's development of a home-grown natural law theory,
the brief experiment with empire and positive law might have been altogether
discredited. By contributing to the survival of the Former Han,2 the Huang-
Lao helped foster the growing belief that a politically unified China was more
natural than a fragmented (and inevitably warring) collection of states.2
1
Peerenboom's analysis of the Boshu tells an additional and even more
interesting story about natural law as a comparative concept. God's role in
European natural law is to add strength to natural law's transcendence. Natural
law without God would have "transcendence of the weak sense," 2 best
described as "an organic or holistic natural order. There is no deity, no
autochthonous supreme being, that exists apart from the natural order and
imposes order on the cosmos. Dao simply is the natural order." 33 This
contrast is one of many, including that between unidirectional and bidirectional
discovery of the moral order254 and between rule of law and rule of man,7
which Peerenboom deploys to tame the ambiguities inherent in the European
use of natural law.
Carine Defoort, in an otherwise sympathetic review, refers disapprovingly
to Peerenboom's "obstinate quest for clarity. ''2- 6 She feels that he is trying,
per impossibile, to get a sharp picture of an unfocused reality?'7 and also
criticizes his attribution of transcendence to the Huang-Lao.? 8 Defoort's
accusation that he is taking too much latitude in translation2s9 raises a
general problem in the comparison of cultures. How do you translate a Chinese
work that does not care whether its concepts are transcendental into a language
like English, in which words have to be either abstract or concrete? The
Chinese regard tian (heaven) as the source of all order. Inevitably, she
concedes, we have to translate tian in some contexts as an abstract principle
of order, in others as "the concrete sky, the weather, the day.' ,26 But
Peerenboom has made too much use of this opportunity: "[Elven within one
250. The early Han rulers are known as the "Former." \Vestem. or -Hsi" Han.
251. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 2. at 247.
252. Id. at 83.
253. Id.
254. See id. at 176.
255. See id. at 171.
256. Carine Defoort, The 'Transcendence' of Tian, 44 PHIL E. & W. 347. 347 (1994) (revtewing
PEERENBOOM, supra note 2).
257. See id. at 348 (arguing that -a certain degree of obscurity has probably always characterized the
category 'Huang.-Lao').
258. See id. at 352.
259. See id. at 354-58.
260. Id. at 354.
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passage tian is alternatively translated as 'nature,' 'heaven,' 'natural
order.' '26' The result is a text that is "fluently English in language and
thought. The Boshu writer makes perfect sense. No illegitimate jumps are
made from 'is' to 'ought,' because this confusion has been taken care of in the
charitable translation." 2
The disagreement between Peerenboom and Defoort is restricted to
whether the silk manuscripts used the word tian in a transcendental sense.
Defoort agrees that the Huang-Lao viewed nature as "impersonal, constant,
rule-governed, and normatively prior to humanity."263 This dispute over one
Chinese word perfectly illustrates the problem of cross-cultural
comparison."6 As a counter to Peerenboom's taxonomy of natural law,
Defoort offers a metaphor that operates at the same fundamental level in China
as does French's mandala in Tibet. To Chinese eyes, the most impressive
feature of the night sky was not planetary motion or the annual round of the
zodiac constellations, but the fact that everything else revolved around the Pole
Star. This became their metaphor for political power-as above, so
below-and the axis that joined the emperor's palace to Polaris was seen as
the first and deepest cut into an undifferentiated universe. 265 Defoort
explains: "The fertile obsession in Chinese philosophy is ... with the
possibility of perfect and restless carving and with the uncarved center from
which all division starts," not with "mirroring another realm. 2 66 The Han
philosophers found order and constancy in the night sky. In the Pole Star as
the still point of a turning world, they found a metaphor for the emperor's wu-
wei (having-no-activity).267 In T.S. Eliot's words, "there the dance is/But
neither arrest nor movement., 268 Peerenboom offers us a painstaking analysis
of Chinese philosophical terms. Defoort offers us an insight into Chinese
261. Id. at 358.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 352. As Peerenboom points out, Defoort regards Huang-Lao as natural law, though of an
immanent, nonfoundational variety. See R.P. Peerenboom, The Rational American and the Inscrutable
Oriental as Seen from the Perspective of a Puzzled European: A Review (and Response) in Three
Stereotypes-A Reply to Carine Defoort, 44 PHIL. E. & W. 368, 374 n.2 (1994).
264. As Ariel Glucklich has described it: "Is [understanding other cultures] the formulation of dualistic
explanations, scientific theories that reduce cultural phenomena to causal principles? Or is it the empathetic
but nonsystematic intuition of the hermeneutical verstehen [understanding]?" ARIEL GLUCKLICH, THE SENSE
OF ADHARMA 3 (1994). Defoort, "the European/Continental philosopher... overly relying on the
ambiguity and openness of metaphor," is Glucklich's hermeneuticist. Peerenboom, supra note 263, at 376
n.15. Peerenboom, whose objectionable feature is his search for clarity by way of a "Cartesian demand for
perfect clarity and strictly demarcated definitive criteria," is Glucklich's dualist. Id. at 372.
265. The Qin emperor, for example, sponsored 12 monumental metal sculptures, which may have
represented the circumpolar stars and may have been placed in 220 BCE in a temple dedicated to the
imperial cult of Polaris. See Bodde, supra note 205, at 56 n.52.
266. Defoort, supra note 256, at 363.
267. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 2, at 181 (describing vu-wei as nonimpositional action, "not the
imposition of a given form of behavior but rather behavior that emerges from the creative activities of
persons cooperating in the pursuit of a common goal"); id. at 220 (noting that wu-wei literally means
"having-no-activity" and is sometimes understood as limiting one's acts to what is necessary and natural).
268. T.S. EuoT, Burnt Norton, in FOUR QUARTERS 13, 15 (1943).
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philosophical rhetoric. She would no doubt agree with Rorty that "[ilt is
pictures rather than propositions, metaphors rather than statements, which
determine most of our philosophical convictions." '269 Were we to take one
further step and expose the dominant metaphor as contingent, we would have
arrived by another route at postmodernism's central concern. As it happens, the
Pole Star metaphor is geographically contingent. Though mapped directly onto
the night sky, it is merely local knowledge: Only if you live north of the
Tropics does the night sky orbit the Pole Star. Seen from within the Tropics,
from Java or Sri Lanka for instance, the night sky tells a linear "up and over"
narrative instead.270
IV. COMPARING CULTURES: WHY, How, AND WHICH?
Thus far we have given separate consideration to French's account of
Tibetan legal culture and Peerenboom's reading of early Chinese legal history.
Now let us begin to think of them together. I believe we can learn more from
them together than we can from each apart, because I regard the comparative
method as a useful tool for generating new understandings of disparate
cultures. Twenty years ago this would have been a truism. Now it has to be
defended against the postmodern proposition that cultures can be so different
as to be incommensurable. I shall argue for an alternative postmodern approach
that sees comparison as an area of conversation, a discourse, rather than a
discipline. First, however, I must be explicit about the kind of comparison I
propose.
The law texts of the Dalai Lama's Tibet and Han China were addressed
to two audiences. They were copied, discussed, and annotated by a narrow
group of specialists who had not yet developed into a legal profession. And
they addressed a wider audience of peasants, farmers, merchants, and soldiers.
The available evidence suggests that the latter audience did not share all of the
specialists' attitudes to law: The narrow legal culture was too technical to be
adopted wholesale as the wide legal culture of the illiterate or semiliterate
peasantry. In comparing Tibet and China, I suggest we limit ourselves to the
beliefs of the literate specialists. The legitimation problem (the degree to which
narrow and wide legal culture overlapped) is best left to general historians who
are able to draw on a much wider range of evidence. The narrow legal culture
justified the shape, content, and existence of law primarily by invoking the
authority of the past. Such claims invoking the past lead us back inexorably
to the earliest law texts within each tradition. We have to use the genealogical
method (which means tracing the themes of each tradition back to their earliest
textual appearance) in order to evaluate these claims. Tibetan law justified
269. RoRTY, supra note 225, at 12.
270. See AN"\'hONY F. AVENI, EMPIRES OF TIME: CALENDARS, CLOCKS AND CLLT.RES 294-95 (1989)
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itself as Buddhist law. Was this true? In Part II, I showed that the legal culture
of the Dalai Lama's Tibet was a manifestation of a written legal tradition as
old as China's. The legal literature discussed by French used themes, stories,
genres, and ethical topoi (rhetorical commonplaces) that were written down by
Buddhists in India in the first century BCE and were first composed up to four
centuries earlier. French has described the final flowering of 2500 years of
Buddhist law. Peerenboom has described the earliest phases of the equally
venerable Chinese legal tradition. I want to compare these traditions, with
particular emphasis on the choices that were made at the birth of Buddhist and
Chinese legal literature.
Were I using the formal disciplinary language of comparative law, I would
propose that Buddhist law and Chinese law constitute a new field of research
on which sophisticated comparative techniques can be deployed in expectation
of rich results. But I have been scared off such bombastic language by the
postmodem analysis of disciplinary truth claims. Comparative lawyers,
impressed by the universality of their subject matter as compared with that of
the "simple technicians of the national law,"27 claim social scientific status
for their discipline. Yet too often the rules they compare have been wrenched
from legal textbooks regardless of context. In Pierre Legrand's words, students
of comparative law "forget about the historical, social, economic, political,
cultural, and psychological context which has made that rule or proposition
what it is."'272 The work of such nineteenth-century pioneers as Henry Maine
and Karl Marx is so much richer than contemporary efforts that it seems to
come from another discipline;273 perhaps the term "comparative law" is now
so tainted that we should refer to context-rich comparative studies as a quite
different discipline-as "legal cosmology" 274 perhaps, or as "comparative
legal cultures. '275  The arbitrary data manipulated by contemporary
comparativists do not yield fruitful results. More worryingly, comparative
law's practitioners have hardly considered what should count as a fruitful
result of comparative research. In my view, the conclusions of a typical
comparative law project are prefigured by the researcher's choice of what to
compare. While a comparison of chalk with cheese must necessarily highlight
271. Pierre Legrand, How to Compare Now, 16 LEGAL STUD. 232, 235 (1996). Legrand notes "that
comparative work suggests an expanded intellectual range, if not erudition." Id. at 234.
272. Id. at 236.
273. See Bernard Rudden, Comparative Law in England, in COMPARATIVE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM:
HISTORICAL AND SOCIO-LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 79, 87 (W.E. Butler & V.N. Kudriavtsev eds., 1985) ("The
earlier scholars such as C. Butler, Maine, and Maitland were primarily interested in comparative legal
history.").
274. FRENCH, supra note 1, at 59.
275. Csaba Varga, Introduction to COMPARATIVE LEGAL CULTURES at xv, xix (Csaba Varga ed.,
1992); see also Friedman, supra note 6, at 52 (arguing that "comparative legal culture" should replace
"traditional comparative law"); Volkmar Gessner, Global Legal Interaction and Legal Cultures, 7 RATIO
JURIS 132, 133 (1994) (arguing that structural approach to sociology of law should be supplemented with
"comparison of legal cultures").
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the question of edibility, a comparison of chalk with marker pens will focus
on legibility. Likewise we know, even before we begin the research, that a
comparison of the law relating to road traffic accidents in Connecticut and
France will highlight macroeconomic questions about loss shifting and
transaction costs, while the same comparison between Connecticut and England
will highlight the role of the jury in tort trials.
Rather than claiming that comparison can produce objectively verifiable
results, we should regard the comparative method as fruitful when it increases
our understanding of the objects compared. Ideally we should achieve a better
understanding of both chalk and cheese, but usually we use the "foreign" legal
system to generate a fresh understanding of our local legal tradition.
Comparison becomes a device to make the familiar seem strange.216 The
foreign culture gives us a sharper sense of the unfamiliar paths that our legal
culture might have taken. Using foreign cultures this way is connected to other
tropes that invoke chalk for the better understanding of cheese. Metaphor is the
least formal of these, being fast and allusive where comparison is pedestrian
and exhaustive. A more formal trope was the eighteenth-century penchant for
ventriloquizing one's comments on local customs into the mouth of an
outsider.27 Like metaphors and like eighteenth-century social comment, the
comparative method must be judged by whether it works to increase the
reader's understanding, rather than by whether it is true or false.
My strictures on comparative law strike a postmodern note. Since there are
so many varieties of postmodernism, I must explain which note I have tried to
hit. I am more interested in the epistemological tendency within
postmodernism (which concerns itself with the truth claims of academic
disciplines) than with the aesthetic wing (which promotes pastiche in the arts).
Among the epistemologists, it is Lyotard and Rorty who have helped me
understand the understanding of law.278 This Neo-Pragmatic tendency
276. Such a use of comparison is an answer to Robert Bums's prayer. -0 wad some Power the giftic
gie usfTo see oursels as ithers see us!" ROBERT BURNS. To a Louse: On Seeing One on a Lady's Bonnet
at Church, in THE COMPL.ETE POETICAL WORKS OF ROBERT BURNS 43. 44 (1912) Rudyard Kipling
similarly asked the rhetorical question, "And what should they know of England who only England know""
RUDYARD KIPLING, The English Flag, in SELECTED PROSE & POETRY OF RUDYARD KIPLING 23.23 (1937).
277. This topos was connected with universal, natural law truths: "'The device of portraying one's own
civilization through the eyes of others ([Oliver] Goldsmith's Chinese. [Baron Charles del Montesquicu's
Persians ... and Voltaire's traveller from Sirius) was associated with the belief that there was a true
standard for all humanity and that the civilization in question was contrary to nature." I LESZ K
KOLAKOWSKI, MAIN CURRENTS OF MARxISM 40 (P.S. Falla trans.. 1978).
278. Two articles define the common ground and the differences between Rony and Lyotard
particularly well. See Richard Rorty, Habermas and L.'orard on Postnodernity. in ZEITGEIST Ix BABEL:
THE POSTMODERNIST CONTROVERSY 84 (Ingeborg Hoesterey ed.. 1991); Willem van Rctejn & Dick
Veerman, An Interview with Jean-Franois Lyorard. 5 THEORY CULTURE & SocVY 277 (Roy Boyne trans..
1988). In the former, Rorty attempts "to split the difference between Lyotard and (Jurgen] Habermas."
Rorty, supra, at 95. Rorty accepts "Lyotard's postrnodemist 'incredulity towards metanarratives."' id.. but
excoriates Lyotard's avant-gardeism: "The attempt of lefust intellectuals to pretend that the avant-garde is
serving the wretched of the earth by fighting free of the merely beautiful is a hopeless attempt to make the
special needs of the intellectual and the social needs of his community coincide," td. In the latter article,
Lyotard accepts that "'Rorty's thesis of generalized interlocution can avail itself of a rationalism, which
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presents a history of European high culture from Immanuel Kant to Hans-
Georg Gadamer. Near the start of modernism, Kant provided three separate
critiques of how we pursue truth, goodness, and beauty. In relation to Kant,
postmodernism raises the trinitarian question: Are the mental faculties involved
in these pursuits three aspects of a united self, or three separate selves?27 9
More recently, Gadamer has sought to bolster European understanding by
appealing to European tradition; he reassures us that our philosophical
conclusions are correct within the limitations of our intellectual history.28°
In relation to Gadamer, postmodernism is the process by which we get used
to the idea that the European philosophical tradition is merely local knowledge,
that Plato and all his interpreters constitute just another folk-philosophical
tradition. Postmodernism complains that our philosophical understanding of the
world has failed to progress, even as technology moved from steam power to
the silicon chip and as financiers moved from the trading mechanisms of the
East India Company to those of the global electronic market. European
philosophy has gotten stuck because it has demanded the impossible. We not
only want to know the right answer; we crave guarantees of rectitude,
reassurances that this alone, and no other possible answer, is universally
correct. David Hall refers to this as our "disease of 'metamentality."'' He
explains: "One of the surest signs of [the crisis of the modem age] lies in the
fact that we have developed a rabid (cultural) self-consciousness that has
forced us above first-intentional considerations to the level of metatheoretical
endeavors. '' 2 Rorty's aim has been to deflate the metatheoretical pretensions
of European philosophy, while Lyotard has targeted those accounts of history
that stress teleology or structure, the grand narratives of Giovanni Battista
Vico, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and Marx. Between them, Rorty and
Lyotard have undermined the foundations on which epistemology, history, and
social science have sought to rest their truth claims.
Postmodernism has as yet had less impact on law than on other disciplines.
This is because the European legal tradition relinquished its foundational
claims at the beginning of the nineteenth century. For two thousand years,
I would say is neither bourgeois North American ... nor anaemic, but of a rationalism conscious of that
which comprises what is absolutely discussable."' van Reijen & Veerman, supra, at 304 (quoting Lyotard).
Rorty is misled, however, in thinking he can get the essential on the cheap by carrying the pragmatic
relationship to a transcendental level: "'It is as if the 1/you relationship marked by the exchangeability of
letters between persons or empirical individuals were a transcendental condition of philosophy, of history,
of progress, of Enlightenment, in short of those things that he is concerned with (and I am certainly not
scornful of them)."' Id. at 306 (quoting Lyotard).
279. See Dick Veerman, Introduction to Lyotard, 5 THEORY CULTURE & Soc'Y 271, 273-74 (1988)
(arguing that Kant addressed nature of thinking, doing, and feeling and tried to bridge gap between them,
but Lyotard concludes they are incommensurable).
280. See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall
trans., Crossroad, 2d rev. ed. 1989) (1960).
281. David L. Hall, Modem China and the Postmodern West, in CULTURE AND MODERNITY: EAST-
WEST PHILOSOPHIC PERSPECrIVES, supra note 15, at 50, 54.
282. Id.
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natural lawyers had attempted to ground law in some metaphysical, religious,
or rational truth. In their hostility to natural law, such disparate lawyers as
Jeremy Bentham, 3 Maine, and Marx were united. Once law is viewed as
an emanation of the nation state (whether as the command of a positivist
sovereign, as the expression of freely contracting citizens, or as the will of the
dominant class), it cannot claim to be any more than local knowledge. Since
the early nineteenth century (when our discipline took this nationalistic turn),
we have learned simply to accept, for example, that common law and civil law
conceptions of ownership start from different premises.? We would not now
waste time arguing that one is true and the other false, particularly since we
know that the two systems tend to produce convergent answers to practical
problems.285 Since the early nineteenth century, law, unlike other disciplines,
has had to accept less ambitious truth claims for itself. Hence postmodernists
can describe contemporary law as "the quintessentially postmodern form of
social knowledge--explicitly constructed ... transient and disposable ... and
highly localised. ''8 6
By reducing everything to hermeneutics (to the nature of human
understanding rather than to objective truth), postmodernism strips comparative
law of any pretensions it had to social scientific status. Does it also deny that
the comparative method can ever generate fresh cultural understanding?
Lyotard takes this further step by claiming that individual intellectual traditions
are incommensurable with each other: There is no common scale of
measurement by which they can be weighed and evaluated.? Traditions may
or may not be mutually incomprehensible; what is important to Lyotard
(because it guarantees a plethora of culturally autonomous zones) is that one
tradition cannot pass judgment on another. Thus physicists, moral philosophers,
and critics belong to incommensurable traditions, even if they have all been
educated at French universities. So do such socially marginalized groups as the
redundant steel workers of Lille or the North African immigrants of the Paris
suburbs. In the background looms Lyotard's paradigm case of the
incommensurability of traditions: Asia versus Europe.2 If Asian legal
283. Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) was a pioneer of legal positivism. a populanrzer of utilitarianism.
and a law reformer.
284. See F.H. Lawson. Common Law, in 6 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW:
PROPERTY AND TRUST ch. 2, at 22, 24 (Frederick H. Lawson ed.. 1975).
285. See id. at 22; F.H. Lawson, Comparative Conclusion. in 6 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIvE LAW: PROPERTY AND TRUST, supra note 284. ch. 2 at 137. 141.
286. ROGER COTTERRELL, THE SOCIOLOGY Or LAW 308 (2d ed. 1992).
287. How Lyotard's incommensurability thesis relates to other postmodermsms (including those of
Rorty, Derrida, Michel Foucault, and Pierre Bourdieu) is carefully and cntically examined in MCGOWAN.
supra note 13, at 180-210. Anglophone views on incommensurability (as espoused by Kuhn. Rorty. and
Maclntyre) are discussed in Richard J. Bernstein. Incommensurability and Oth*erness Revisited. in CULTURE
AND MODERNtTY: EAsT-WEST PHILOSOPHIC PERSPECTIVES. supra note 15. at 85. 87-93
288. See MCGOWAN, supra note 13, at 188 (arguing that Lyotard's incommensurability oscillates
between, at one extreme, "an endless proliferation of 'private languages'" and, at the other. "some
fundamental East/West distinction").
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traditions, such as the Tibetan and the Han Chinese, are incommensurable with
the traditions of American legal scholarship, then French and Peerenboom have
attempted the impossible, and this Review can only judge the distance by
which French and Peerenboom have failed. If Lyotard is right, we can only
compare different traditions by comparing degrees of incomparability.
Rorty is more optimistic about our attempts to cross the
incommensurability barrier: "If there is no such common ground, all we can
do is ... be hermeneutic about the opposition-trying to show how the odd
or paradoxical or offensive things they say hang together with the rest of what
they want to say, and how what they say looks when put in our own
alternative idiom."28 9 "[D]espite his reliance on the term," argues McGowan,
"Rorty chooses not to take incommensurability very seriously."29 Indeed,
Rorty's favored niche for contemporary philosophers is as contrabandistas
smuggling understanding across the incommensurability frontier. The metaphor
he uses is more law-abiding and philanthropic. He likens the hermeneutic
philosopher to the ideal host of a campus cocktail party. Because I find this
metaphor extremely helpful in understanding the comparative method, I shall
quote it at length and elaborate it further:
I think that the view that epistemology, or some suitable successor-
discipline, is necessary to culture confuses two roles which the
philosopher might play. The first is that of the informed dilettante, the
polypragmatic, Socratic intermediary between various
discourses .... The second role is that of the cultural overseer who
knows everyone's common ground-the Platonic philosopher-king
who knows what everybody else is really doing whether they know
it or not, because he knows about the ultimate context (the Forms, the
Mind, Language) within which they are doing it. The first role is
appropriate to hermeneutics, the second to epistemology. 9'
The message, for Rorty's fellow philosophers, is that in mixed disciplinary
company they are to mingle with historians, literary critics, and sociologists as
if on equal terms. They should join in the general conversation, offer the
drinks around, and be nice to the other guests.2" They should not treat the
gathering as a lecture on, or trial of, the pretensions of other disciplines: At
Rorty's party there are no podia, no seats of judgment, but only a commitment
to keeping conversation alive. This image of intellectual life as an endless
289. RORTY, supra note 225, at 364-65.
290. McGOWAN, supra note 13, at 195.
291. RoRTY, supra note 225, at 317-18.
292. Maclntyre objects: "[I]f I am doomed to spending the rest of my life talking with literary critics
and sociologists and historians and physicists, I am going to have to listen to a great deal of philosophy,
much of it inept." Alasdair Maclntyre, Alasdair Maclntyre on the Claims of Philosophy, LONDON REV.
BooKs. June 5-18, 1980, at 15 (reviewing, inter alia, RORTY, supra note 225). We lawyers, who have had
to listen to philosophers spouting inept law, may raise an eyebrow at this.
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party in which specially trained hosts ("informed dilettantes") charm the guests
out of their seclusion is attractive, as Lyotard himself recognizes. 23 Since the
more enjoyable campus parties have guests from different cultures as well as
from different disciplines, it is an image that can be adapted to cross-cultural
understanding. Rorty's Socratic, polypragmatic hosts are adept at smoothing
over interdisciplinary problems. To ensure that the conversation flows between
Tibetans, Americans, and Chinese, we need Heroditan, polyglot hosts-in
short, comparativists such as French and Peerenboom. The comparative method
is nothing more than the empathetic good manners that foster cross-cultural
conversations at Rorty's party: "Hermeneutics sees the relations between
various discourses as those of strands in a possible conversation, a
conversation which presupposes no disciplinary matrix which unites the
speakers, but where the hope of agreement is never lost so long the
conversation lasts.' 29
Rorty has made attendance at his party conditional on two rules. We shall
not be his welcome guests unless we forbear from saying, "I'm right-you're
wrong," and, "Oh, I see-when you say X, you really mean Y."-5 He
designed these rules in order to prevent disciplines from jockeying for status
and prestige, but they are equally effective in preventing the weeds of
ethnocentricity from clogging cross-cultural channels of communication. To
say, "I'm right-you're wrong," is to assume that our local definition of law
and its sources applies around the world. Legal anthropology has learned to
avoid this mistake,2 9 6 but only over the last fifty years. To find unself-
conscious assumptions of the superiority of European definitions of law we
need only go back to the colonial law reports.2 97 To respond, "When you say
293. Lyotard commented:
Let us go back to my relation with Rorty. There is something very powerful, but sophisticated.
in his rhetoric. He says, "we should drop all foundationalism. as it is put in the United States.
it is without interest since it is indecidable. Only one thing is decidable, that is whether we do
or do not speak together."
van Reijen & Veerman, supra note 278, at 304 (quoting Lyotard).
294. RoRrY, supra note 225, at 318.
295. In Rorty's own words:
For hermeneutics, to be rational is to be willing to refrain from epistemology-from thinking
that there is a special set of terms in which all contributions to the conversation should be
put---and to be willing to pick up the jargon of the interlocutor rather than translating it into
one's own.
Id. Bemstein gives the same advice in the opposite order:
We must [listen carefully to alien traditions] in such a way that we resist the dual temptations
of either facilely assimilating what others are saying to our own categories and language
without doing justice to what is genuinely different and may be incommensurable or simply
dismissing what the "other" is saying as incoherent nonsense.
Bemstein, supra note 287, at 93.
296. See, e.g., Rebecca Redwood French. Law and Anthropology. in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY
OF LAw AND LEGAL THEORY, supra note 60. at 397. 398 (noung that legal anthropology's "comparison[s
between legal systems are contextually situated and attempt to avoid normative judgments.. [and) often
do not employ Anglo-American jurisprudential categories or legal systems as their basis for comparison-)
297. A particularly ripe example from 1920s Burma is described in Hla Aung. The Judicial Polhc, of
the British Colonial Government in Burma, GUARDIAN (Rangoon). May 1967. at 42. 43. The Indian
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X, you really mean Y," is to force interlocutors to use your own terms. It is
an act of cruelty, albeit often well-intentioned cruelty. The virtuous wish to
present exotic material for popular consumption leads to the vice of
mistranslating dharma as "law" or li as "custom." At the more subtle level
debated by Peerenboom and Defoort, this becomes the vice of presenting what
is vague and implicit in the original text as clear and explicit in translation. As
long as we follow Rorty's rules of etiquette, we can keep the cross-cultural
conversation going. As long as the Sino-American conversation continues, the
spectre of incommensurability between Chinese and American traditions is held
at bay. Such are the truth claims of postmodern comparative law: A cross-
cultural comparison is good if it stimulates the conversation, bad if it empties
the room.
I am proposing that The Golden Yoke and Law and Morality in Ancient
China enable a stimulating comparison between Buddhist and Chinese legal
traditions. What common ground do we have to help get this conversation
started? We can point out that Buddhist and Chinese legal traditions are
equally old, dating to the last five centuries BCE. We can note that in both
cultures legal literature means not just written rules such as the Vinaya and the
Qin Emperor's code, but also written polemics pro and contra the process of
writing rules down. In China and India, jurisprudential debate and written law
are of equal age. We could attempt to ascertain whether Indian and Chinese
processes were independent of each other.298 We could ask whether common
factors were simultaneously at work in North India and North China: Did
urbanization have to reach a critical mass? Or did literacy have to spread from
the governing elite down to the market traders? Had improved bronze
technology led to a greater agricultural surplus or made the army more
effective as a centralizing force? Such questions are very much to my taste, but
it may be that, if we accept Lyotard's strictures against grand narrative, we are
no longer allowed to discuss them. A scheme of human history that is broad
enough to be applicable globally may be deemed too ambitious. If Marxism
is the grandest of the grand Enlightenment narratives, can we still tell the story
that goes: "Once upon a time humanity lived by hunting and foraging, then
they invented settled agriculture, then they stumbled into the Industrial
Revolution"? 299 Our cross-cultural conversation will grind to a halt unless we
Contract Act invalidated contracts that were contrary to the laws. Although the Vinaya forbade conveyances
from laymen to monks, a British court in 1929 held that laws were rules of civil conduct enforced by the
state and, since the rules of the Vinaya were not enforced by the state, they were not laws in the proper
juridical sense of the word. See U Pyinnya v. Maung Law, I.L.R. 7 (Rangoon) 677 (Rangoon H.C. 1929)
(Full Bench).
298. On current knowledge, we can rule out diffusion, since the direct trade between India and China
started no earlier than the last century BCE. See Andrew Huxley, The Reception of Buddhist Law in S.E.
Asia 200 BCE-1860 CE, in LA RICEPTION DES SYSTtES JURIDIQUES 139, 151 (Michel Doucet & Jacques
Vanderlinden eds., 1994).
299. If we think the long haul from homo habilis to the agricultural empires of the fertile crescent
needs to be distinguished from the age of writing, religion, and rice, then we shall have to distinguish
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can situate India and China within a common developmental schema. We need
a frame of reference within which, for example, we can understand the Qin
Emperor and King Asoka as facing commensurate challenges. Will
postmodernism allow us a frame of reference? Ernest Gellner's Plough, Sword
and Book" provides reassurance that big historical schemas can be
succesfully postmodernized. Gellner retells Marx's schema of the stages of
production as a story about changes in cognition and legitimation. The success
of his account suggests that we can retain a global historical schema, as long
as we jettison Marx's simplistic picture of economic base determining
ideological superstructure. Gellner unravels the complex links between base
and superstructure. To mention only those that are most relevant to the birth
of written law, agriculture and the spread of literacy produced new job
opportunities for soldiers and priests. These soldiers and priests then had to
create ideologies in order to make themselves indispensable; they safeguarded
their new jobs by developing new services, writing new texts, and establishing
new areas of expertise."°1 Lawyers can be seen as a branch of Gellner's
"clerisy," and written law as part of the legitimating "doctrine" enunciated by
the clerisy.
30 2
Our comparative conversation about the birth of Chinese and Buddhist
legal literature can proceed as a series of thought-experiments in which we
examine each factor in turn, while holding the other factors as constant.
Treating urbanization as the variable, for example, we can ask whether the
differential growth of cities in India and China affected the processes of state
formation and the attitudes to law. Postmodernism emphasizes one variable in
particular, that of language. What we say is shaped and constrained by the
language in which we say it. Gadamer links European philosophy with Indo-
European grammatical structure by asking: "Even before the game of world
history began, did some cast of the dice fatally compel us by means of our
language to our way of thinking ... ?,,303 How could we talk about the
world in a language whose grammar was not analyzable into 'the language of
metaphysics with whose categories we are familiar from grammar-subject and
predicate, nomen and verbum, noun and verb"?"3 Gadamer's rhetorical
questions can only be answered if postmodernists are prepared to compare the
European intellectual tradition with the philosophical literature of non-Indo-
European languages. Chad Hansen is engaged in precisely this kind of thought-
premoderniry (the age of hunter-gatherers) from postpremoder v (the age of settled agriculture). Cf I
MARSHALL S. HODGSON, THE VENTURE OF ISLAM 109 n.3 (1974) (insisting on "the starthng lustoncal
contrast between conditions before and after the development of citied and lettered life- in agrarian
civilizations).
300. ERNEST GELLNER, PLOUGH, SWORD AND BOOK: THE STRUCTURE OF HUMA.N HISTORY (1988)
301. See id at 21-23, 275-76.
302. Id. at 73-74.
303. GADAMER, supra note 280. at 545.
304. Id.
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provoking work. In a tonal language such as Chinese, 05 he explains, words
may act as nouns, verbs, or adjectives depending on context.3" This, coupled
with noninflected grammar, focuses attention away from the subject and
predicate sentence onto the phrase:
These observations about the differences between Chinese and English
syntax explain (from a Chinese point of view) why we place so much
emphasis on the sentence, or (from our point of view) why Chinese
philosophers do not. Either of two morals can be drawn: Chinese
thinkers have a blind spot or we have an obsession.3"
Hansen concludes that for a Chinese gentleman of the Han Dynasty or earlier,
knowledge meant pragmatics-knowing how to-rather than semantics
-knowing that.308 This is fundamental to the understanding of early Chinese
texts, but Hansen does not find a full-blown Lyotardian incommensurability
between Indo-European and Sinic languages. He shows that concepts
originating and readily expressible in Indo-European tongues can also be
expressed in Chinese.309 The examples he gives are drawn from the Chinese
reception of Buddhism. Buddhist analysis, translated from the Indo-European
languages of Sanskrit and Pali, smuggled Aryan understandings of language,
truth, and law into the thinking of India's eastern and northern neighbors.10
The unstable boundary between West and East shifted once again.
Without Hansen's comparative philosophy, Gadamer's dark suspicion that
language constrains philosophical analysis would have remained untested.
Without the comparative method, postmodern analysis is doomed to inhabit a
world of unique singularities. Lyotard and Rorty have produced sophisticated
accounts of the last two centuries of European intellectual life. Because the
industrial revolution was sui generis, they had no need of comparison. As
postmodernism looks back beyond the eighteenth century to examine the
premodern roots of European modernity, it engages with topics as to which
305. Tibetan and Burmese are also tonal. See Scott DeLancey, Sino-Tibetan Languages: Introduction,
in THE WORLD'S MAJOR LANGUAGES 799, 805-06 (Bernard Comrie ed., 1987); Julian K. Wheatley.
Burmese, in THE WORLD'S MAJOR LANGUAGES, supra, at 834, 842.
306. See Chad Hansen, Chinese Language, Chinese Philosophy, and "Truth", 44 J. ASIAN STUD. 49 1,
498-500 (1985).
307. Id. at 500. Notice Hansen's scrupulous concern not to choose between the Chinese speaker's and
the English speaker's comparison. Contrast Maclntyre's dictum-"The key to comparative studies is the
comparison of comparisons," Maclntyre, supra note 226, at 121-which suggests that an extra nugget of
information can be derived by comparing the blind spot with the obsession.
308. See Hansen, supra note 306, at 493. Karl Potter makes a similar claim about Indian philosophical
language. See Karl H. Potter, The Commensurability ofIndian Epistemological Theories, in CULTURE AND
MODERNITY: EAST-WEST PHILOSOPHIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 15, at 123, 124. Because most Indian
philosophy was written in Indo-European languages, there seem also to be nonlinguistic factors that push
towards pragmatism.
309. See Hansen, supra note 306, at 504.
310. For the influence of Buddhist ontological prejudice on Chinese semantic theory, see id. at 504,
508. For the suggestion that Buddhist "dharma" affected the meaning of '"fa," see Chad Hansen, Fa
(Standards: Laws) and Meaning Changes in Chinese Philosophy, 44 PHIL. E. & W. 435, 481 n.5 (1994).
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comparison is both possible and desirable. Derrida has examined the history
of European writing and the techniques (such as canonicity and the ascription
of authority to an author) by which texts are imbued with power.3" India and
China have literary traditions that are at least as old as Europe's; Indian and
Chinese intellectuals dealt with similar problems of power and authority.
Postmodernists who plead incommensurability as an excuse not to join this
comparative conversation may be suspected of ethnocentric arrogance.
My suggestion that postmodernists should make more use of the literate
traditions of Asia cuts both ways: We who work on Asian cultures should pay
more attention to parallels with the European tradition and to our own
European disciplinary assumptions. This has a very specific bearing on my
proposal that we use The Golden Yoke and Law and Morality in Ancient China
to compare the emergence of written law in the Buddhist and Chinese
traditions. I suggested above that comparative legal research usually used the
"foreign" legal system to generate a better understanding of the local system.
Postmodern analysis shows this to be inevitable: The familiar tradition within
which we were trained defines what we mean by "understanding." French,
Peerenboom, and I practice in a legal tradition that had its origins in
Republican Rome. If we are to prevent the terms and assumptions of this legal
tradition from contaminating our analysis, we must explicitly include it in our
comparison. Most readers will be familiar with the origins of written European
law, so I need only give a reminder of the state of the Romanist's art.
The earliest surviving traces of written Roman law are the archaic
fragments of the Twelve Tables (approximately 450 BCE).312 A thousand
years later came the compilation of Justinian's Corpus luris Civilis (530 CE),
the most important of surviving Roman law texts.3"3 Within this millenium,
the most interesting period for our purposes lies between Rome's establishing
de facto dominance in the eastern Mediterranean in 188 BCE and Rome's
instituting a de jure empire over the region in 31 BCE.314 Roman law was
organized into literary genres by a succession of praetors holding office during
the second century BCE, by Quintus Mucius Scaevola (assassinated 82 BCE),
"the first man to produce a general compendium of the civil law by arranging
it into eighteen books, 315 and by Servius Sulpicius Rufus (consul in 51
311. See JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans.. Johns Hopkins
Univ. Press 1976) (1967).
312. See STEIN, supra note 133, at 7.
313. See DONALD R. KELLEY, THE HUMAN MEASURE 53-56 (1990).
314. See THE TIMES ATLAS OF WORLD HISTORY 77 (Geoffrey Barraclough ed.. rev. ed. 1984) (noting
that Rome won effective domination over eastern Mediterranean in 188 BCF. but l[ilt was only after the
defeat of Cleopatra VII ... at the naval battle of Actium in 31 BC[EI. that Rome legall) as ,ell as
effectively held the whole of Alexander's heritage in her hand").
315. 1 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 9 (Theodor Mommsen et al. eds. & G.E.M. de Ste. Croix ct al.
trans., 1985) (translation of DIG. 1.1.2.2 Pomponius. iber Singulari Enchindii) (written about 150 CE)
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BCE), who "left almost one hundred eighty books. 31 6 But it was the lawyers
of the classical period (100-250 CE) who reaped all the credit. Methodically,
succinctly, sometimes pompously, the classical lawyers worked through every
hypothetical debating point and exhausted every possible category. Classical
they may have been; innovators they were not. The European tradition of
written law was created by the lawyers of the later Republic. It was they who
bequeathed the genres, the style of disputation, and the rhetoric of authoritative
pronouncement to the classical lawyers and, via a long chain of Digests,
Glosses, Commentaries, Institutes, and Manuals, to us.3 7 It is they who must
be compared with the compilers of the Vinayapali, the Boshu, the Han Fei Zi,
and the legal codes of the Qin and the Han.
These crucial Roman developments happened about a century after the
legal innovations of the Qin. I suspect that the important Buddhist legal
developments were even earlier, but the dating of the Vinayapali is not yet
firmly established .3 " To say that Rome trailed behind India and China is to
speak solely of written legal rules. In China and India, jurisprudential debate
and written law developed together, but the Roman jurists were notoriously
reluctant to discuss legal theory. To find the Roman equivalent of the
jurisprudential discussions in the Boshu and the Bhaddali sutta, we must read
the orator, politician, and philosopher Cicero (106-43 BCE). He provided our
only full-length Latin exposition of the links between written law, natural
science, and ethical duty.319 For good measure, he added a discussion of the
legal specialisms and the direction that further professionalization ought to
take. Yet Romanists treat him with scorn: "Well may we complain of the fate
which has preserved so utterly worthless a work as Cicero's De legibus, but
has allowed [Scaevola's lus civile,] the book which laid the foundations not
merely of Roman, but of European, jurisprudence to perish. 320 Cicero is
indicted on two counts: that his philosophy is an unoriginal reworking of
Hellenistic sources (mainly Stoic, but also Aristotelian and Epicurian) and that,
having received the best juristic education available in Rome, he wasted it by
316. Id. If Pomponius, our main source for early Roman legal developments, had told us the sources
on which he drew, we might view his account less suspiciously. As things stand, his is the only game in
town; if we reject his account of the period, we have no other.
317. See generally KELLEY, supra note 313 (tracing idea of law from ancient Greece to present
century); STEIN, supra note 133 (describing juristic rules of Roman law and tracing their development in
medieval and Renaissance civil law).
318. The Buddha formulated the Patimokkha rules around the time of the Twelve Tables, but the
Patimokkha must have remained an oral text for centuries thereafter. It is the 1500 pages of the Vinayapali
that have influenced all subsequent Buddhist legal genres. There is no consensus as to when this text was
brought together; I favor the second or third century BCE.
319. See Ernst Levy, Natural Law in Roman Thought, 15 STUDIA ET DOCUMENTA HIsTORIAE Er IURIS
1, 2 (1949) ("Cicero holds an outstanding position in the field [of Roman natural law theory]. Greatly
impressed with the doctrines of the Greeks, especially Aristotle and the Stoics, and brought up in the milieu
of the schools of the rhetors, he became acquainted early with the subject of natural law.") (footnotes
omitted).
320. FRITZ SCHULZ, HISTORY OF ROMAN LEGAL SCIENCE 94 (1946).
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becoming a courtroom orator. Cicero is probably guilty on the first count, but
this cannot be conclusively proven, since the works he allegedly plagiarized
have not survived. The jurisprudential texts of Hellenistic philosophy are in
fragments, many of them preserved by Cicero himself. If I could wish for the
magical reappearance, Boshu style, of any one classical law text, I would
rather have one of these Greek works-Zeno's On Law perhaps, or a collection
of the Stoic ethical casuistry known as "parainetikos kai hypothetikos
topos"321-than Scaevola's attempts to reorganize the civil law. On the
second count, Cicero is guilty as charged, but the offense is anachronistic: The
assumption that pleaders (those who establish the facts of the case) are inferior
to lawyers (those who establish the norms that govern it) developed long after
Cicero's time. Cicero's jurisprudential works complicate our attempts to
establish a relative chronology for the emergence of Eurasian written law.
Scaevola's rules and Cicero's jurisprudence were both written in Latin between
100 and 43 BCE. We are certain that Scaevola's work was original, but we are
fairly sure that Cicero was influenced by an earlier literature written in Greek.
European jurisprudence, it would appear, is older than European rule books.
The Roman authors of rule books are admired for their methodical disciplinary
approach. How much of this Roman legal science was derived from Greek
philosophy? Putting the question in a general enough form to apply to
Buddhism and China, how important is philosophy's role as midwife to the
birth of written law?
Rhetoric geared to courtroom oratory was one of the most prominent
Hellenistic sciences,2- and Cicero admitted Stoic influence on his philosophy
of law. Was Stoic dialectics" responsible for creating what Europeans call
legal science? Classicists have labored mightily to solve this "great controversy
as to the extent of Greek influence on late Republican jurisprudence. 32 4 On
321. 2 SExTus EMPIRICUS: AGAINST THE LOGICIANS 6 (R.G. Bury trans.. 1935). The phrase by wich
this school is known may mean "'branches of Ethics. such as the hortatory and admonitor)." id. at 7. but
"hypothetikos" might be translatable in this context as "hypothetical" rather than "hortatory," see HENRY
GEORGE LIDDELL & ROBERT ScoTT, A GREEK-ENGUSH LEXICON 1882 (Sir Henry Stuart Jones ed.. 9th
rev. ed. 1996). This practical branch of Stoic ethics dealt with particular problems such as mamage and
the treatment of slaves. See Gerard Watson, The Natural Law and Stoicism. in PROBLFMS IN STOICISM 216.
238 n.45 (A.A. Long ed., 1971).
322. See J.A. CROOK, LEGAL ADVOCACY IN THE ROMAN WORLD 30-33 (1995) (describing Athenian
forensic advocacy). The Greek style of advocacy also spread to other Hellenistic cities. See id. at 36.
323. Catherine Atherton explained the significance of Stoic dialectics:
One of the central tenets of Stoic philosophy is that the universe is a divine, ranonal, and
coherent ordering....
It is [in the Stoic sage's use of reason to act in accordance with nature] that dialecuc
demonstrates its practical value. As a body of theoreucal knowledge, dialectic furnishes relevant
technical information about the sorts of item that constitute. structure, and charactense minds.
language, and the arguments by which men seek to reason and convince.
CATHERINE ATHERToN, THE STOICS ON AMBIGUITY 51-53 (1993).
324. Elizabeth Rawson, The Introduction of Logical Organisaion in Roman Prose Literature. 46
PAPERS BRIT. SCH. ROME 12, 28 n.64 (1978).
1997] 1935
The Yale Law Journal
the narrow question of whether Hellenistic logic and rhetoric contributed to the
organization of legal data, Fritz Schulz 325 and Watson316 interpret the
limited evidence in radically different ways. Elizabeth Rawson has advanced
the debate by setting it in a wider context. Looking at legal literature as part
of Latin prose as a whole, she notes a gradual increase in specialization during
the first century BCE with some division between speakers in the courts and
legal experts, adding: "These were however only slow developments, and the
lawyers remained men of wide education and background, conversant with the
fashionable subjects of grammar and rhetoric, and often with philosophy.
327
On the even narrower question of whether Roman jurists used Stoic
propositional logic, Juan Miquel has demonstrated examples of such use in
three classical jurists.328 The defining choices about the shape of legal
literature in Latin were made between 150 and 50 BCE, but the Romans who
made these choices drew on Hellenistic, particularly Stoic, philosophy written
in Greek between 300 and 150 BCE. The extent to which Stoic dialectics
imparted a self-conscious theorizing to our law remains in dispute. But there
is no doubting the influence of Stoic jurisprudence on Romans and, through
them, on Roman Christians.329 In Stig Str6nmholm's words: "[Tjhe Stoics
gave Occidental legal thinking (and political theory in a broader sense) an
ethical content which has played an exceedingly important role ever
since.
'330
Our European legal tradition turns out to be older and more polyglot than
one might have guessed. It was a joint venture between pragmatic Roman
patricians and Hellenistic Greek philosophers. This fact drapes a certain
objectivity around my proposal to compare the births of Buddhist, Chinese, and
European law. If we are looking at the wider Hellenistic world instead of
central Italy and its dependencies, we can add into our consideration Greece
and the Eastern Mediterranean, Ptolemaic Egypt, Seleucid Iran, and Graeco-
Bactrian Afghanistan. Combine these countries with India and China, and we
have, I think, exhausted the literate cultures of Eurasia during the last five
325. Schulz spoke for those who believed the Greek influence was great:
The importation of dialectic was a matter of extreme significance in the history of Roman
jurisprudence and therefore of jurisprudence generally. It introduced Roman jurisprudence into
the circle of the Hellenistic professional sciences and turned it into a science in the sense in
which that term is used by Plato and Aristotle no less than by Kant.
ScHuLz, supra note 320, at 67 (footnote omitted).
326. See ALAN WATSON, LAW MAKING IN THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC 183 (1974) ("[O]f the idea
of species as a subdivision of genus there is not the slightest trace in juristic thinking in the Republic.").
327. Rawson, supra note 324, at 25.
328. See Juan Miquel, Stoic Logic and Roman Jurisprudence, in THE WESTERN IDEA OF LAw 333,
334-37 (J.C. Smith & David N. Weisstub eds., George H. Kendal trans., 1983). This is a partial translation
of an article that appeared as Juan Miquel, Stoische Logik undRdmische Jurisprudenz, 87 ZEtTsCHRIFT DER
SAVIGNY-STIFTUNG FOR RECHTSGESCHICIITE: ROMANISTISCHE ABTEILUNG 85 (1970).
329. Stoic jurisprudence, through St. Paul and the Church Fathers, influenced Eastern Orthodoxy as
well. See Stanley S. Harakas, Eastern Orthodox Perspectives on Natural Law, 24 AM. J. JURIS. 86, 89
(1979).
330. STIG STROMHOIM, A SHORT HISTORY OF LEGAL THINKING IN THE WEST 43 (1985).
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centuries BCE. Given the importance of literacy to the manifestations of
cultural tradition, there can be nothing contingent about my choice of China,
India, and the Hellenistic world as the areas to be compared. The contingency
(which I argued above is to be found in any comparative law project) lies in
my choice of Stoics, Buddhists, and Huang-Lao as the traditions within each
area that merit special consideration.33' Invoking classical learning provides
my comparison with an important resource: The classicists have delved much
more deeply than Sinologists or Buddhologists into the relationship between
philosophy and written law. In the next Part, I shall suggest that the Stoic,
Buddhist, and Huang-Lao philosophies share certain qualities that facilitated
the birth of written law.
V. NATURAL LAW AS A COMPARATIVE TOOL
How can we best describe the qualities shared by Buddhist, Huang-Lao,
and Stoic texts? To use a European expression as familiar as "natural law"
smacks of ethnocentrism. Yet how else can Europeans begin to understand the
wholly unfamiliar belief systems of India and China? Whether natural law
proves useful as a cross-cultural comparative tool can only be shown by
attempting the comparison at length and in detail. This is a task that I hope to
pursue and in which I hope to be joined by classicists and Sinologists.
Meanwhile, I must pay off a debt to Peerenboom. When I first read Law and
Morality in Ancient China, I was trying, with little success, to compare natural
law themes in Buddhism and Stoicism. Peerenboom's use of natural law as a
comparative concept inspired me. What Defoort refers to as his "relentless
pursuit of clear criteria ' 332 provokes both admiring agreement and productive
disagreement. In this Part, I discuss why my use of natural law as a
comparative concept differs from his.
Peerenboom deploys a series of analytical distinctions to separate the
various natural law theories.333 At the Chinese end of the comparison, this
enables him to divorce natural law from theology: The Huang-Lao can be
natural lawyers although they do not believe in a creator God. At the European
end, it enables him to produce a typology of our natural law tradition. His four
main varieties are divine law (whose "laws are the direct commands of a
transcendent deity who represents an ultimate source of value"), 33 laws of
nature (which "ground law in the normatively transcendent natural order"), 3"
moral grounds ("which are seen as self-evident or to reflect some ultimate
331. The Legalists have very good claims to be included. The Hindu dharmasastnsts will also stakc
their claim.
332. Defoort, supra note 256, at 348.
333. See supra text accompanying notes 252-55.
334. PEERENBOOM, supra note 2, at 21.
335. 1d. at 119.
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value that cannot be compromised or questioned"), 336 and pure reason (which
"seeks to provide rational foundations for law and legal obligations by deriving
them from self-evident first principles or from 'truths' about human
nature"). 337 To illustrate these varieties he uses contemporary juristic
discussion: John Finnis exemplifies pure reason,338 the moral grounds are
defined by H.L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin's refutations of positivism,
3 39
and foundationalism is contrasted with the coherence theories of John Rawls
and Joel Feinberg.Y0 Peerenboom's view of natural law is weighted towards
the twentieth century; he favors contemporary theorists over their predecessors
from the Enlightenment colleges or the medieval seminaries. Let us call
Peerenboom's view "developed European natural law." By comparing the
Huang-Lao with this, he has opted for a comparison that is doubly displaced
in space and time, that crosses both cultural barriers and the millenia. I propose
a singly displaced comparison that sets the Huang-Lao against their European
contemporaries, the Stoics. Let us call the ideas shared by the texts of these
two traditions (and also their Buddhist contemporaries in India) "early natural
law." The watershed between early and developed lies somewhere between the
Emperors Constantine (who was proclaimed Emperor in 306 CE) and Justinian
(who died in 565 CE), during the era when Christian ideas were mixed into the
Stoic. I argued in Part IV that we cannot measure the relative value of one
comparison over another. Peerenboom's developed European natural law and
my early natural law are equally good. But they generate different versions of
European natural law. On the far side of the watershed, early natural law may
have more in common with India and China than with the developed Christian
tradition.
Peerenboom gives the impression that developed European natural law is
primarily about transcendence and dualism. I agree that dualism is endemic in
European thought and that transcendence is the lowest denominator common
to all natural law theories, but the natural law tradition contains as many ideas
on politics or science as on metaphysics and epistemology. Although not
present in every theory, they deserve our attention, too." We can cast
Justinian, Aquinas, and Hugo Grotius from our minds, the better to understand
the pre-Christian natural law that Zeno and Chrysippus taught. In doing so, we
shall have dug down to the very taproot of developed European natural law.
As Maryanne Cline Horowitz puts it: "While the Stoics borrowed some of [the
four unit-ideas of natural law, i.e. reason, common notions, seeds, and sparks]
336. Id. at 22.
337. Id. at 119.
338. See id. at 23.
339. See id. at 22.
340. See id. at 20.
341. I am driven to this stance by my attempt to introduce Buddhism into the comparison, since
Buddhism appears to combine transcendence with a militant antidualism.
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from their philosophical predecessors, they themselves did the work of
synthesis, building upon these unit-ideas a coherent doctrine of natural law in
man. ' 42 But we shall have to take the Stoics more seriously than Gerard
Watson, who warns us never to forget "the origins of natural law and its early
rhetorical flavour. The rhetoric may be inspiring at times as in the case of
Antigone and the 'unwritten laws'; but it remains rhetoric. And rhetoric is not
designed to promote clear thinking. '" Watson has misunderstood what we
can hope to learn from old law texts. Just as archaeologists tell us what was
put in the grave, but not why it was put there, so interpreters of texts tell us
what rhetoric was deployed, but not how it was understood at the time.
In relation to The Golden Yoke, I described what the surviving texts cannot
tell us as the hermeneutic that proto-lawyers apply to legal literature.3" It
can also be described as the culture's repertoire of legal reasoning. We can
only hope to know it if it has survived as an oral tradition of legal education,
embodied in a continuing lineage of pupils and pupil-masters. Whatever it was
that Cicero learned during his pupillage with Scaevola3 5 cannot now be
reconstructed from the surviving literature; classical legal reasoning is lost
beyond redemption. There are as many interpretations as interpreters of
Cicero's legal theory.3 6 We have lost the oral lineage of the Burmese legal
profession and, but for French, would have lost that of the Tibetan specialists
as well. All that has survived from antiquity is the natural law rhetoric shorn
of the belief system that made it effective. To understand early natural law we
have to reimagine the beliefs and contexts that made natural law rhetoric
effective. I shall discuss three areas in which this early natural law differs from
Peerenboom's developed European tradition. First, it concentrates on the
relationship between law and science rather than that between law and morals.
Second, its politics concentrate on the problem of controlling the bad king
rather than the justification of natural rights. Third, it prefers to analyze
situations rather than rules. These three tendencies can be demonstrated in the
surviving texts from China, India, and the Hellenistic world.
342. Maryanne Cline Horowitz, The Stoic Synthesis of the Idea of Natural Law in Alan. Four Themes.
35 J. HisT. IDEAS 3, 3 (1974); cf Gisela Striker, Following Nature: A Study in Stoic Ethics. 9 OxFORD
STUD. ANCIENT PHIL. 1, 35 (Julia Annas ed., 1991) ("It would be an exaggeration to say that the idea of
a natural law was invented by the Stoics .... However, the Stoics were the first to introduce the idea of
nature as a kind of personal lawgiver .... ) (footnote omitted).
343. Watson, supra note 321, at 221. By contrast, a contemporary pragmaust judge refuses to be
embarrassed by the rhetoric. See RICHARD A. POSNER. THE PROBLEMS OF JIRISPRUDENCE 238 (1990)
("Our dominantly positivistic discourse has enough natural law play in its joints to give us all the rhetorical
flexibility we need.").
344. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
345. See SCHULZ. supra note 320, at 44.
346. See, e.g., Ludovico V. Ciferri, Cicero s Conception of lunsprudenta. 38 REvLE Lt,ERN ATIONALE
DES DROrrS DE L'ANtQUIT (3d s.) 103. 113-19 (1991) (arguing that Cicero believed Roman lawyers
should combine previously distinct roles of courtroom orators and junsconsults); J.W. Tellegen. Oratores,
Iurisprudentes and the "Causa Curiana", 30 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DES DROrTs DE L'ANTIQUITI (3d s.)
293, 294-95, 309-11 (1983) (arguing that classicists' distinction between orators and junsconsults is
incorrect and that Cicero described courtroom advocates as skilled legal experts).
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Examining the developed European natural law, Peerenboom regards the
necessary relation between law and morals as a "fundamental tenet of natural
law theory."3 47 Examining the early natural law, I would apply that label to
the relation between law and science. Buddhist, Huang-Lao, and Stoic ethics
formed part of all-inclusive pictures of how the world worked. Are such
inclusive pictures best thought of as schools of thought, religions, or
ideologies? In a very different context, Frederick Crews has defined a term that
fits better than any of these:
While classic Marxism and psychoanalysis insist upon their
observational basis, they also constitute inside critiques of received
knowledge .... and they bestow epistemic privilege on a group of
deep knowers ... who possess an antidote to chronic error...
[T]hey are countersciences-creeds that use a dry mechanistic idiom
and an empirical fagade to legitimize "deep," morally engaged
revelations .... 34
Early natural law justified universal ethical laws ("'deep,' morally engaged
revelations") in terms of proto-science ("a dry mechanistic idiom and an
empirical fagade"). Stoics and Buddhists, like Marxists and Freudians, had all-
embracing worldviews; their countersciences provided them with answers to
practically any question you might care to ask. Crews argues that because their
claims cannot be falsified, Marx and Sigmund Freud should not be regarded
as scientists. 349 Postmodernists would retort that the truth claims of quantum
physics or organic chemistry rest ultimately on the shared beliefs of their
practitioners, wherefore they are neither more nor less scientific than Freudian
psychoanalysis. 35' Because science is a branch of human understanding, they
would argue, its pronouncements cannot be wrung free of human fallibility.
The early natural lawyers used a structurally similar argument: Because science
is a branch of human understanding, its pronouncements must have ethical
significance. Connected by chains of cause and effect, science was ethical and
ethics was scientific. Stoics and Buddhists, who had more elaborate and
systematic causation theories than the Huang-Lao, were driven too close to
determinism for their own comfort. An important function of Stoic and
Buddhist natural law was to preserve free will, or at least moral autonomy,
within a scientifically predictable world.3 '
347. PEERENBOOM, supra note 2, at 20.
348. Frederick Crews, In the Big House of Theory, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May 29, 1986, at 36, 38 (book
review).
349. See id.
350. See Stanley Fish, Professor Sokal's Bad Joke, N.Y. TIME-:S, May 21, 1996, at A23 (arguing that
science is "social construction").
351. See TROELS ENOBERG-PEDERSEN, THE STOIC THEORY OF OIKEIOSIS: MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND
SOCIAL INTERACTION IN EARLY STOIC PHILOSOPHY 217-19 (Stud. Hellenistic Civilization No. 2, Per Bilde
et al. eds., 1990) (arguing that concurrence of causal factors made Stoic notions of individual responsibility
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I must avoid giving the misleading impression that the early natural
lawyers had a clear picture of what science was. Knowledge had not yet been
carved up into disciplinary fields: Early law and ethics were part of an
integrated wisdom that included proto-history as well as proto-science. The
early legal authors wanted to know what ethical conclusions could be drawn
from science, history, and current affairs. They drew on three types of books:
first, records of astronomical data; second, the great cultural compendia that
preserved the ancestral ethics and wisdom; and third, historical chronicles.
Astronomy enabled the king to lay down the calendar. The cultural compendia
(by which I mean Homer and Hesiod for Hellenistic Greece, the Vedas for
North India, and the Shijing (Classic of Odes) and Zhou li (Rites of Zhou) for
pre-Confucian China)352 contained ancestral ethics and such wisdom as had
survived from the Golden Age. The proto-historical chronicles served as
collections of precedents, understood as much in the scientific as in the legal
sense: They were the records of social science experiments in what could and
could not be achieved. 353 With hindsight, we would say that astronomy dealt
with the universally true, the ethical compendia contained what was true for
several kingdoms sharing a common language, and the chronicles told the true
history of a particular kingdom. But the purpose of natural law rhetoric is to
conflate these sources. The compilers were anxious to legitimate their written
law by whatever arguments lay to hand, and thus blurred the scientific with the
ethical, the descriptive with the prescriptive.
That one of the Boshu's four books is called Weighing by the Scales
reminds us that mensuration (the measurement of space and time) is especially
productive of natural law rhetoric, because it sits on the cusp between the
scientifically determined and the arbitrary. The standardization of
measurements was a central policy of the Qin emperor.35 For all his subjects
(except crooked market vendors), his mensuration policy must have been the
single obvious benefit of Qin unification. One can see why his propagandists
would link a potentially unpopular legal unification policy to such a successful
policy.355 Their message was that the imperial code could be relied on as the
possible); Bandula Jayawardhana, Determinism and Indeterminism. in 4 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF BUDDHISM
fascicle 3, at 392, 397 (Ananda W.P. Guruge & W.G. weerarate eds.. 1988) (arguing that condtioned
becoming as middle way between being and not-being is also middle way betwecn free will and
determinism); Charlotte Stough, Stoic Determinism and Moral Responsbility. in T'HE STOICS 203.222-25
(John M. Rist ed., 1978) (arguing that moral responsibility is our intelligent assent to what will happen to
us anyway).
352. For extracts from the Chinese compendia, see Weng Shaojun. A Comparative Study of Natural
Philosophy in Pre-Qin China and Ancient Greece, 21 CHINESE STUD. PHIL 3. 4,-5 (1990).
353. For instance, that the fall of Qin proved that the common people would not put up with harsh
Legalist policies. In India, such chronicles did not appear until well into the Common Ea. Buddhist
literature provides the earliest Indian historical works but is concerned solely with personalities (such as
King Asoka) important to Buddhism.
354. See Bodde, supra note 205, at 59-60. He also standardized cash (the measure of exchange value)
see id. at 60, and unified the script (the measure of information exchange), see td. at 56-58.
355. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 2, at 68 (quoting two passages from Boshu linking la% with
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farmer relied on moon and calendar to sow and reap, on scales and numbers
to buy and sell. Then as now, a belief in naturally given units of measurement
prevailed. It was as convincing to say, "I have discovered the proper size for
a bushel," as to say, "I order that my imperial standard bushel be used."
Another passage from the falsifiable to the contingent is offered by the
calendar. Although it prescribes the ritual tempo of human social life, its
authority is founded on description of the night sky. Greek astronomers of the
fifth century BCE recognized that their old eight-year cycle for reconciling the
lengths of the solar and lunar years was less accurate than the new nineteen-
year Metonic cycle. Most city-states adopted new calendars based on the new
science, treatJng the length of the year as constrained by nature, but Athens,
Boetia, and Actia chose three different days for New Year's Eve.356 None of
them was right. Science can help us measure the length of the year more
accurately, but cannot help us choose on which night, out of 365 equally good
candidates, we should hold our party. An emperor who uses the right kind of
rhetoric can make his arbitrary choice sound impeccably scientific. "The wisest
astronomers of this, the wisest of cities," he might say, "advise me that the
year starts with the heliacal rising of Beta-Delphini."
The second area in which early natural law differs from developed
European natural law is the political. The natural law revival of the last half
century has achieved its practical gains in the field of human rights. Such
transnational rights can perhaps be regarded as a consolation prize for the
failure to achieve a world government. The Huang-Lao and the Stoics were
also deeply involved with political centralization.357 The Huang-Lao version
of natural law helped keep the notion of empire alive after the debacle of the
Qin dynasty, while the Stoics looked back wistfully on Alexander's failure to
secure his succession:
Alexander, albeit for a short while, had shown that almost all the
known world could be combined, that barbarian and Greek could be
subjects in one empire, but the key point is that he failed and this led
to the subsequent disorder. Zeno and his contemporaries suffered from
this failure, yet the possibility of unity could be seen.358
The affinities between universal law and world empire are obvious enough, but
the political problems caused by empire need further emphasis. Peerenboom
weights and measures).
356. See APURBA KUMAR CHAKRAVARTY, ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN CALENDRICAL
ScIENCE 20 (1975). Chakravarty similarly notes that in India, "[i]n more ancient times, we are told
that ... different castes began their years in different seasons."' Id. at 19 (quoting Jyotisa.bhasya of
Nirnaya Sindhu).
357. This was less true of Buddhism. During the Buddha's lifetime, the small kingdoms of North India
were being absorbed by larger ones. Not until two centuries later did Asoka unite the larger kingdoms into
an empire.
358. ANDREW ERSKINE, THE HELLENISTIC STOA 34 (1990).
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understands Huang-Lao natural law "in part as an attempt to curtail the powers
ceded a Legalist ruler. '35 9 His analysis of Han China coincides with my
conclusions about Buddhist India. The overriding constitutional problem of the
ancient world was this: "Given the political preeminence of the king (or
emperor or sultan) who can restrain him from evil and encourage him to do
good? 36 Hellenistic philosophy offered answers to this question. But we
have impoverished our European political discourse by taking Plato and
Aristotle, rather than Stoic natural law, as our starting point. Compared with
those of India and China, our ideas on controlling kingship are
underdeveloped, and our literature on the pragmatics of autocracy a woefully
late development: India's Machiavellian 361 Arthasastra362  and China's
Machiavellian 363 Legalist literature predate Niccolo Machiavelli by well over
a millenium. Very few of the European leaders between Alexander of Macedon
and Thomas Jefferson thought of themselves as democrats. In this sense, the
two centuries of Greek experimentation with democracy were an aberration
that knocked our political theory out of step with the rest of Eurasia. Because
Plato and Aristotle wrote from two centuries' experience of nonmonarchical
government, Europe now talks about politics rather than kingship and looks for
a constitution rather than an ethical canon to limit government's activities. This
quirk of history has enabled liberal modernity to promote the city-states of
fifth-century BCE Greece as a golden age that should be retrieved. Liberal
modernity's global project is to persuade Paraguay, Nigeria, and Korea (to take
names at random) that American, African, and Asian history started in
Athens. 3'6
I turn now to the third area in which early natural law differs from
developed European natural law, and in which my use of natural law as a
comparative tool therefore differs from Peerenboom's. His developed tradition
tends to think of natural law as a set of rules, as found for example in the Ten
Commandments, the Corpus luris Civilis, Aquinas's Suinnia Theologica, or
Grotius's De Jure Belli ac Pacis. My early tradition thinks of it as a technique
359. PEERENBOOM, supra note 2, at 140. The great Legalist Han Fei espoused "positive law %here
the ultimate authority is the word of the sovereign." id.
360. Huxley, supra note 163, at 411.
361. See MAX WEBER, MAX WEBER ON CAPITALISM, BcREAtcRAcY A ND RELIGION 2 (Stanislav
Andreski ed., 1983) (noting that Machiavelli had "predecessors in India"). td at 85 (descibing Indian
political theory as "quite Machiavellian"). Weber does not specifically mention Kauulya's Arthasastra. but
the reference is obvious.
362. KAUTILYA's ARTHASASTRA (R. Shamasastry trans., 4th ed. 1951). See generally A.L BAStA.,t,
THE WONDER THAT WAS INDIA 51-52, 80-137 (3d rev. ed. 1968) (describing ancient Indian politics and
Arthasastra's political theory).
363. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 2, at 153-61, 318 nn.33 & 39.
364. See, e.g., Andrew Hacker, Editor's Preface to DONALD KAGAN. TIlE GREAT DIALOGUE: HISTORY
OF GREEK POLITICAL THOUGHT FROM HOMER TO POLYBIUS at vii. vii (1965) (arguing that ideal of civilized
government "is our legacy from the ancient world" and that Greek political ideas and institutions remain
"unfinished business" from "the out-stations of the Congo to the villages of the Colombian Andes. from
the jungles of Southeast Asia to the rural roads of the Mississippi Delta").
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for handling situations. In the Pali Buddhist context, I called this technique
weak antinomianism.365 It requires careful observation of the world's natural
processes coupled with a meditative inquiry into one's own human nature and
understanding of the world. The Huang-Lao epistemology led the adept
through graded steps from emptiness, through tranquillity, to elimination of
personal bias, and on to intuitive clarity.366 Having put himself in order, the
adept was able to "manipulate the orderly to put in order what [wa]s out of
line, to grasp the one to understand the many, to eradicate what br[ought]
injury to the masses and to maintain what [wa]s appropriate for them."
367
The Buddhist arahant (one who has overcome greed, fear, and delusion)
achieved a full knowledge of karma by studying individual cases of
rebirth.368 Having meditated enough to achieve retrocognition, he could treat
the past lives of present humans as observable scientific data. Knowing whom
karma punishes for doing what, he knew the natural laws. The early Stoics
envisaged scrutinizing all natural processes to discover the logos (the
clockwork by which determinate nature proceeds).369 The Stoic sage would
then internalize the logos so that his own wishes coincided exactly with it.
370
Lucius Annaeus Seneca wrote two very long letters summarizing the
Hellenistic and Roman debates about the value of praecepta (ethical rules
formulated legalistically) as against training the self to achieve sagacity.,"
From these, I.G. Kidd has reconstructed the range of early Stoic views on the
relative value of rules and situation-techniques.372 Zeno and Chrysippus, he
says, had a twin ethical strategy. They showed the would-be Stoic sage how
to live without rules following logos, virtue, and nature, while to the Stoic in
the street, l'homme moyen sensuel, they expounded the ethical precepts of ta
kata physin (the things that accord with nature).373
365. See supra text accompanying note 175.
366. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 2, at 70.
367. Id. at 53 (quoting Boshu).
368. The Buddha did not describe himself as omniscient. Rather he claimed to be a "'threefold-
knowledge man.' ... This threefold knowledge, he sa(id], consist[edl of (1) retrocognition of past
lives .... (2) the knowledge of the passing away and coming to be of beings according to the
consequences of their actions ... and (3) the knowledge of the destruction of defiling impulses."
Jayawardhana, supra note 351, at 406 (quoting 2 THE COLLECTION OF THE MIDDLE LENoTH SAYINos
(MAJJHIMA-NKAYA), supra note 178, at 160).
369. See Striker, supra note 342, at 3-4 (noting that Zeno defined goal of ethics as living in
accordance with logos or "principle" of nature).
370. The process was profound and difficult: None of the early Stoics claimed to have achieved
sagehood, and no contemporary set of laws could live up to the natural law standard. See ERSKINE, supra
note 358, at 114-16.
371. See 3 SENECA, AD LUCILIuM EPISTULAE MORALES 10-105 (Richard M. Gummere trans., 1925).
372. See I.G. Kidd, Stoic Intermediates and the End for Man, in PROBLEMS IN STOICISM, supra note
321, at 150, 164-65.
373. See id. at 165. Chrysippus is referring to these precepts when he says: "'The law of all things.
is that which enjoins men, who are by nature political animals, to do the things which must be done and
that which proscribes the things which must not be done."' JOSIAH B. GOULD, THE PHILOSOPHY OF
CHRYSIPPUS 165 (1970) (quoting Chrysippus, On the Law, in 3 STOICORUM VETERUM FRAOMENTA:
1944 [Vol. 106: 1885
Golden Yoke, Silken Text
Early natural law's general preference for situational ethics over explicit
rules must surely connect with its preference for theories of causation that
emphasize complexity and multiplicity. The Buddhist theory, which stresses
that the multiple causes act with equal force, offers a knock-down argument
to the concept of rule: A rule is a schema that deals with situations by
unscientifically distinguishing causal efficacy. Certain causes are foregrounded,
others backgrounded. A rule about inheritance, for example, foregrounds
kinship and backgrounds the cause of death. Even in common law
jurisdictions, however, there can be extreme situations in which the cause of
death affects our sense of justice, as Riggs v. Palner" demonstrates. To
justify evading an inconvenient rule, the European tradition has to resort to
devices like the maxims of equity or Dworkinian principles: These are needed,
Buddhists would say, to patch over the holes in a leaky theory of causation.
This shift of emphasis from rules to observation of what goes on in the
world also shifts the emphasis from nature as legislator to nature as
punisher.375 In Buddhism, karmic punishment is as natural a process as that
which links chlorofluorocarbon gases to the degradation of the ozone
layer.376 When Buddhist vinayadharas warn that corrupt officials risk rebirth
with deformed and enlarged scrota,372 they are offering prudential advice,
just as if they had warned us that if we put our hands in the fire, we will feel
pain. Hadley Arkes identifies similar prudential reasoning behind Cicero's
condemnation of the cancellation of debts." Cicero understood that it would
bring swift, certain consequences: "[A] rule so bound up with the grounds of
equity could not be violated without causing the surest recoil on the part of its
victims., 3 79 In Christianity, by contrast, the inevitable fate of the sinner-a
brusque exchange with St. Peter, followed by consignment to Hell-operates
supernaturally. Borrowing H.L.A. Hart's terms, we can say that the developed
European tradition has preached a primary-rule-only natural law, while the
early tradition expounded a natural law containing secondary rules of
CHRYSIPPI FRAGMENrA MoRAL A [ET] FRAGMENTA SUCCESSORI CHRYSIPPI 1 314 (loannes Ab Armn
ed., 1903)).
374. 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889). For a classic discussion of this case's refusal to permit a patncide to
inherit from his father, see BEN.IAmIN N. CARDOZO. THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 40-43 (1921)
375. The Legalists were halfway between the Hellemstic and the Indian posiuons They thought that
state sanction should mimic natural sanction i its seventy and inexorability "If the law is made sevee
and committing an offence is as fatal as walking into this gorge. then no one will datre violate it Peace and
order will prevail." THE SEVERE CODE OF THE LEGAUST: THE SAYtNOS OF HN FEI 7-1 51 (Ts.u Cluh
Chung ed. & Alan Chong trans., 1991).
376. See supra notes 61-64, 183-86 and accompanying text
377. The example comes from the Sarnantapasadika. See BAPAT & lIRAKAwA. supra note 128, at
351.
378. See Hadley Arkes, That 'Nature Herself Has Placed in Our Ears a Power of Judging' Some
Reflections on the 'Naturalism' of Cicero, in NATURAL LAW THEORY, supra note 89. at 245. 246 (-What
is the meaning, [Cicero] asked, of an 'abolition of debts, except that you buy a farm with m, money; that
you have the farm, and I have not my money?.'") (quoung 21 CicERO IN TE.N'Y-EtGHT VoLtths DE
OFFicus 261 (Walter Miller trans., 1913)).
379. Id. at 269.
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punishment.380 The distinction can be explained by historical context: The
early natural lawyers were concerned not to promote a new set of ethical rules,
but to defend an existing set. I borrow this argument from J.G.A. Pocock, who
investigated pre-Han China in search of the origins of history. He found a
sequence of doctrines that were to be repeated in other places at other times:
First, a set of institutions existing in the past is described as
authorising the maintenance of the same institutions in the present;
next, historical criticism gives rise to the idea that the institutions of
the past are appropriate only in the circumstances of the past, which
no longer obtain in the present; thirdly, the authority of antiquity is
restored, but on grounds which no longer vest authority in antiquity
as such, being those of universal and timeless validity. We appear to
have moved from tradition to reason .... '81
Tradition, argues Pocock, has been knocked off its plinth by sophists and
cynics. Natural law is the movement to reestablish tradition on a new plinth
labelled "universal validity." History, for the early natural lawyers, was as
thoroughly ethicized as science. The chronicles, the astronomical works, and
the early law texts all had a bearing on how good citizens should lead their
lives.
Postmodernism similarly sees all knowledge as part of human
understanding. There are hints, in areas close to law, that postmodernists are
also developing a preference for situational ethics over rules. Lyotard tells us
that "'politics in itself is not a rule-bound enterprise.' 38 2 Rorty suggests that
"[iln a moral world based on what [Milan] Kundera calls 'the wisdom of the
novel' moral comparisons and judgments would be made with the help of
proper names rather than general terms or general principles." '383 As
postmodern jurisprudence expands its vision, I expect to find these hints
developed. 384 The place of rules could be taken by maxims, topoi, which act
380. Cf H.L.A. HART, THIE CONCEPT OF LAW 97-98 (Joseph Raz & Penelope A. Bulloch cds., 2d cd.
1994) (1961) ("Most [legal] systems have supplemented the primary rules of obligation by further
secondary rules, specifying or at least limiting the penalties for violation .... ").
381. J.G.A. Pocock, The Origins of Study of the Past: A Comparative Approach, 4 COMP. STUD.
Soc'Y & HIST. 209, 224 (1962). Weber anticipated one of Pocock's points: "[Natural law] is the specific
and only consistent type of legitimacy of a legal order which can remain, once religious revelation and the
authoritarian sacredness of a tradition and its bearers have lost their force." WEBER, supra note 28, at 288.
382. van Reijen & Veerman, supra note 278, at 298 (quoting Lyotard).
383. Richard Rorty, Philosophers, Novelists, and Intercultural Comparisons: Heidegger Kundera, and
Dickens, in CULTURE AND MODERNITY: EAST-WEST PHILOSOPHIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 15, at 3. 14
(quoting MILAN KUNDERA, THE ART OF THE NOVEL 158 (Linda Asher trans., Grove Press 1988) (1986)).
384. Here as elsewhere, however, there will be argument as to whether the postmodern is an
intensification of the modem or a reaction against it. Steven Lukes has discerned a hostility to rules in the
works of Marx, the doyen of modernists. See LUKES, supra note 66, at 56-57. Lukes says of Marx's
criticism of law:
mhe objection is ... that any system of rules specifying justifiable claims (Recht) treats people
unequally, since, by its very nature, it applies a common standard to them, considering them
in one particular aspect only.... [Marx] seems to have supposed that any rule of law or
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as acceptable points of departure for rival dissections of the instant case. These
would signal the boundaries of acceptable rhetoric and ensure that participants
can understand each other's premises.
Our different comparisons have led Peerenboom and me to take different
views about the degree of antagonism between postmodernism and natural law.
My position is that postmodern ethics shows signs of convergence with early
natural law. He, looking at developed natural law, regards the Huang-Lao
position as philosophically untenable and "out of step with the current
postmodern trend away from natural law theories to a more hermeneutically
sensitive theory la Dworkin."3 5 But surely this trend away from natural
law predates postmodernity? Kant's trichotomy of pure reason, practical
reason, and judgment was an antifoundational argument. 3s6 After the attacks
of Bentham,5 7 Maine,388 and Marx," 9 there was little left for Rorty and
Lyotard to demolish. Lyotard has moved some way beyond the positivism and
historicism espoused by these modernists. He intensifies Kant's trichotomy into
an attack on the subject,390 but at the same time he is confidently committed
to "'natural rights .... [i.e.,) the fundamental freedoms which prescribe the
limits of social fabrication."-' 39' Lyotard's fragmented selves are not ashamed
to draw this much ethical conclusion from their separate understandings of the
world. Antifoundationalism does not prevent us from drawing ethical
conclusions from nature. Nor does the incoherence of grand narratives allow
us to say, "I understand Auschwitz as an event quite without any ethical
morals, which by its very nature singles out certain differences between people as grounds for
differential treatment, is for that very reason "abstract" and "one-sided."
i-
385. PEERENBOOM, supra note 2. at 25; see also id- at 24 (expressing belief that "the Ronty-Sellars
critique seriously undermines the foundationalism of natural law doctrines").
386. See YvEs R. SIMON, THE TRADMON oF NATURAL LANV 42 (Vukan Kuic cd., 1967) ("Mhc fact
remains that Kant (1724-1804) is the philosopher who expressed, with more sharpness and consistency than
any of his predecessors, the contrast between nature and morality.").
387. See 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, Anarchical Fallacies: Being an Examination of the Declarations of
Rights Issued During the French Revolution, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BEW'I'MAM 501 (John Bownng cd..
1843) (characterizing "natural and imprescriptible rights" as "nonsense upon stilts").
388. Maine described natural law as "the ancient counterpart to Benthamism." , t.'E. supra note 53.
at 76. Adam Kuper argues nonetheless "that Maine's model was an inversion of the classic models of the
State of Nature, which he attacked so furiously, but whose idiom he adopted." Adam Kuper. Ancestors:
Henry Maine and the Constitution of Primitive Socierv, I HIST. & ANTHROPOLOGY 265. 284 (1985).
389. See 3 KARL MARX, CAPITAL 339 & n.55 (Int'l Pubs. 1967) (1894) (critictzing defense of
capitalist interest on loans as "natural justice"). A concept of justice might, however, be an appropriate
ideology for a particular stage of human history: "The justice of the transactions between agents of
production rests on the fact that these arise as natural consequences out of the producuon relatonships...
Th[e] content [of these transactions] is just whenever it corresponds, is appropriate. to the mode of
production. It is unjust whenever it contradicts that mode." Id. at 339-40.
390. See van Reijen & Veerman, supra note 278, at 294-95 (quoting Lyotard's argument that "'the
crisis of the subject after Kant"' concerns "the unification of the heterogeneous or autonomous regimes
of judgment"' identified by Kant, "'according to which it is a quesuon of truth, or of beauty, or of the
good"').
391. Id. at 297-98 (quoting Lyotard). This passage serves as an answer to Lyotard's cnucs who would
portray him as an amoralist for whom anything goes. For Lyotard certam minimum values are inescapable.
and human rights must be among our moral commitments.
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significance." We should tease out ethical implications from current affairs,
from history, from technology, and indeed from soap operas, talk shows, and
advertisements. This, which I understand to be the postmodern position, is
entirely consistent with the views of the Buddha, the Boshu, and Zeno. These
early natural lawyers, however, went a stage further: They regarded the data
acquired by introspective emptying-of-the-mind as a suitable foundation for
justifying truth claims. Seen from this angle, postmodernism is early natural
law minus meditation.
Because Weber backed off at the last minute, Peerenboom is the first
person this century to make serious use of natural law as a comparative tool.
Weber was tempted392 but felt that the Christians had beaten him to it. 393
Instead he chose to characterize Asian law as sacred law.394 This use of
religion as a comparative tool was designed to bring out the differences
between Asian and formal-rational, secular European law. The advantage of
using natural law as a comparative concept is that it will do the opposite: It is
designed to emphasize similarities between Europe and Asia.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the last Part, I discussed how Peerenboom and I believe Europeans
might best imagine their way across the incommensurability barrier. He
proposes that we use the idea of Huang-Lao as natural lawyers to gain a
toehold on the glassy cliffs of Han Chinese culture. I would prefer us to dig
our way back to the roots of our own legal tradition and immerse ourselves in
Hellenistic learning before scaling the cliffs. French, meanwhile, has provided
a much easier path across the barrier separating us from Tibet. Along with her
narratives, she offers architectural plans, line drawings, and ethnographic
photographs of Tibet from the 1920s to the 1980s.395 But she is not
interested in finding a European analogue to Tibetan Buddhism. She would
rather we used Tibet to find out more about ourselves: We are to stare into the
glassy cliffs of the Himalayas and describe what we see reflected in them. I
summarized French's challenges to contemporary lawyers at the end of Part
I. These challenges resonate more deeply now that we have examined the roots
of Chinese law and taken a postmodern look at the very idea of comparing
392. He called natural law "the purest type of value-rational validity," but felt it insufficiently
influenced actual conduct. WEBER, supra note 28, at 8-9.
393. See id. at 287 ("We encountered the lex naturae earlier as an essentially Stoic creation which was
taken over by Christianity for the purpose of constructing a bridge between its own ethics and the norms
of the world.") (footnote omitted).
394. See, e.g., id. at 206 ("In their purely external form, all 'sacred' laws tend to approximate a type
which is shown most purely in Hindu law."); id. at 209 (arguing that Hindu law books give "a casuistic
treatment of the legal data that lacks definiteness and concreteness, thus remaining juridically informal and
but moderately rational in its systematization").
395. Cornell University Press's production values have done French proud. The Golden Yoke is a
beautiful object and quite the most lavish legal monograph I have seen.
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cultures. No doubt it is too much to claim that Tibet, Han China, and
postmodernism speak on all matters with a single voice, but on two of
French's challenges Lyotard, Rorty, and the Dalai Lama share enough common
ground with Han dynasty intellectuals to make conversation possible.
The first area on which Tibet, China, and postmodemism converge (which
is the first of French's eight propositions) is hostility to the "[olmnipresent
dualisms ... [that] permeate the investigation, modeling, and presentation of
Western material on legal systems." 39 In relation to China, Hall has found
that "[n]either dualism nor transcendence is present in the original Confucian
or Taoist sensibilities. 397 He explicitly uses the terms in their Derridean,
epistemological sense:
One of the signal consequences of a logocentric language is that there
must be real independence of a proposition from the state of affairs
it characterizes. This entails dualistic relations of propositions and
states of affairs. Without such independence, in the senses of dualism
and transcendence, nothing like logical truth may be formulated.
39
We must ask ourselves this question: Can we think of law, history, education,
and moral behavior as aspects of the same big phenomenon? If we can, we are
using a less dualistic approach to law and morality, prescription and
description, fact and value. If we cannot, we are allowing a false notion of the
autonomy of law to isolate us from relevant information.
The second area (which is French's sixth proposition) is anarchism and the
degree of prominence that each culture allows to it. The Tibetans worked out
a unique compromise between anarchism and law through their doctrine of
"radically particular consent. ' 99 Though this exercise in imagining new
social possibilities was uniquely Tibetan, other cultures have treated anarchism
as an honored strand in their high culture. In Part II, I discussed the anarchist
countercurrent that lurks within Pali Buddhism, ' o and in Part HI,
Peerenboom showed us the contribution to Huang-Lao jurisprudence of the
Daoists, who were the nearest classical China had to an "anarchist tendency."
For two millenia, legal identity in these Asian cultures has been construed out
of a continuing debate for and against the state. By contrast, the anarchist
theme was muted in Greece and Rome and did not emerge clearly in Europe
until the nineteenth century. Even then, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Prince
Peter Alexeivitch Kropotkin hardly attained the prominent place in European
thought accorded to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Dante Alighieri, or William
396. FRENCH, supra note 1, at 343.
397. Hall, supra note 281, at 65.
398. Id. at 64.
399. FRENCH, supra note 1, at 345.
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Shakespeare.40' Perhaps Lyotard's musings on postmodern justice can be
understood as a tribute to this anarchist impulse that surfaced with modernity:
"'[T]he essential heritage of the Enlightenment ... demands that instead of
killing, or putting in prison ... one listen[] to the other and constitute[] the
other through speech as an interlocutor."' 42 Our challenge is to imagine how
different life would now be if Cicero or Virgil had been an anarchist. Had
anarchism been such an established part of our high culture that even
opponents had to pay lip service to its attractions, how much difference would
this have made to European history? Have we behaved in a more "statist"
fashion than the rest of the world because our high culture has pushed
anarchism into the background?
French's challenges remind us of how peculiar our legal tradition appears
to the rest of the world. This European difference can be a cause for pride or
for embarrassment. Let me quote again Hansen's wise words on what can be
deduced from such cross-cultural comparisons: "Either of two morals can be
drawn: [Either they] have a blind spot or we have an obsession.""0 3 Readers
of this Journal have an obsession with legal autonomy but a blind spot to the
noble claims of anarchism. Or, if you prefer, postmoderns, Tibetans, and
ancient Chinese are obsessed with anarchism but blind to legal autonomy.
We will not see the like of The Golden Yoke and Law and Morality in
Ancient China again. The discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls of Chinese law
offered Peerenboom a unique opportunity. French will surely be the last
anthropologist to have studied an undiluted premodern literate legal system by
talking to its practitioners. Nonetheless, French and Peerenboom induce a
premillenial optimism about the direction in which Asian legal studies are
moving. The nineteenth-century founding fathers, Maine, Marx, and Weber,
popularized bold hypotheses in lucid (and, in Marx's case, sparkling) prose.
But their popularizations were premature, since the Asian data they so
confidently synthesized was itself unreliable. No one now seriously believes
that law moves inexorably from status to contract, or that cultures with the
same means of production must share the same legal culture, or that Buddhism
is an essentially otherworldly and antisocial religion. In this century, Asian
legal studies reacted against premature synthesis by retreating into gritty detail.
Scholars have preferred getting small things right to making risky hypotheses
about big issues. Such scholarship, inevitably, is written for a specialist
audience. Browsers seeking an informative introduction to, for example,
Tibetan law are not attracted to such titles as Early Tibetan Law Concerning
Dog-Bite,4 or The Narrative of Legislation and Organization of the Mkhas-
401. On the marginality of European anarchism, see JAMES JOLL, THE ANARCHISTS at viii-ix, 257-59
(2d ed. 1980).
402. van Reijen & Veerman, supra note 278, at 304 (quoting Lyotard).
403. Hansen, supra note 306, at 500.
404. Richardson, supra note 22.
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pa'i dga'-ston: The Origins of the Traditions Concerning Sron-brcan sgani-po
as First Legislator and Organizer of Tibet,45 or indeed Die Handschriften
in den City of Liverpool Musewns (I).406 Yet these are three of the more
important twentieth-century contributions to Tibetan legal history, pre-French.
I take The Golden Yoke and Law and Morality in Ancient China as evidence
that the pendulum may be swinging back. Both books expound highly
technical material for the widest possible audience in an avowedly comparative
framework. Perhaps we have amassed enough gritty detail to risk some new
broad hypotheses. Perhaps the twenty-first century will take up the nineteenth-
century program of explaining the legal traditions of Asia and Europe to each
other.
Parts I and III summarized The Golden Yoke and Law and Morality in
Ancient China. Parts HI, IV, and V used the books as building blocks to
construct a comparison between the three oldest written legal traditions of
Eurasia. Applying the books so blatantly to my own comparative purposes
might seem to abuse a reviewer's privileges. But my comparison is intended
as an example of what these books make possible. For the small investment
of three or four evenings spent reading them, one will painlessly achieve
expertise in the emergence of Chinese written law and the final flourishing of
Buddhist law at state level. Having read them, one can scarcely refrain from
making comparisons. Readers who disagree with the comparative framework
in this Review have all the material they need to construct their own. That is
why The Golden Yoke and Law and Morality in Ancient China transcend their
specialist fields of Tibetology and Sinology: They are "good to think" in that
they promote fresh insights into the European legal tradition. If their reports
on Asian legal cultures are enjoyed merely as ethnology, however, French and
Peerenboom will have labored in vain.
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